

THE IMPACT OF GORBACHEV'S REFORM
MOVEMENT ON THE SOVIET MILITARY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

DEFENSE POLICY PANEL

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HEARING HELD
JULY 14, 1988



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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CONTENTS


1988

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

| | Page |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| Aspin, Hon. Les, a Representative from Wisconsin, chairman, House Committee on Armed Services and Chairman Defense Policy Panel..... | 1 |

PRINCIPAL WITNESSES WHO APPEARED IN PERSON OR SUBMITTED WRITTEN STATEMENTS

| | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Karber, Phillip A., vice president and general manager, BDM International, Inc.: | |
| Statement..... | 1 |
| Prepared statement | 8 |
| Meyer, Steven M., professor of political science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology: | |
| Statement..... | 70 |
| Prepared statement | 77 |
| Snyder, Jack, professor of political science, Columbia University: | |
| Statement..... | 57 |
| Prepared statement | 61 |
| Warner, Edward L., III, senior defense analyst, the Rand Corp.: | |
| Statement..... | 23 |
| Prepared statement | 24 |



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THE IMPACT OF GORBACHEV'S REFORM MOVEMENT ON THE SOVIET MILITARY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
DEFENSE POLICY PANEL,
Washington, DC, Thursday, July 14, 1988.

The panel met, pursuant to call, at 1:05 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the panel) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LES ASPIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WISCONSIN, CHAIRMAN, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will come to order.

This is the third in a series of hearings on the impact that General Secretary Gorbachev has had on the Soviet military.

We have already heard from the intelligence agencies on two general questions: Has Gorbachev's reform campaign resulted in any operational changes in current military behavior, and what sorts of operational changes would convincingly demonstrate that Gorbachev's reforms had actually taken hold in the Soviet Union?

Today we will hear from four well-known outside Soviet experts on these same questions. Perhaps they might also address the question of how the United States should respond to the opportunity presented by Secretary Gorbachev's effort to extend his reform campaign to the military, a subject that the intelligence agencies were reluctant to address.

Our first witness is Mr. Phillip Karber, Vice President and General Manager for National Security Programs at BDM International, Inc. He is a Soviet watcher and also a leading expert on the conventional military balance in Europe.

Our other witnesses will be Dr. Edward L. Warner, who is a senior Defense Analyst at the Rand Corporation in their Washington office and is a leading expert on Soviet military policy and doctrine. Dr. Steven Meyer, a professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Dr. Jack Snyder, Professor of Political Science at Columbia University.

Welcome, gentlemen.

We will be very anxious to hear your statement and get a chance to ask you some questions.

STATEMENT OF PHILLIP KARBER, VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER, BDM INTERNATIONAL, INC.

Mr. KARBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Rather than prepare a formal statement, I tried to put some data together and I am going to talk to that.

The first point I want to make before going into the material is that my own opinion is that Gorbachev is for real. That is, he is really trying to undertake a large-scale change of direction in the Soviet national security establishment.

The problem is we don't know exactly what the manifestations of that change are, so we end up groping in the dark looking for hints and suggestions as to where it might go.

It is interesting to look at the impact Gorbachev has had already in the last three years. Sitting here 3 years ago, I would not have predicted that Gorbachev would have led the Soviets to have the first public change in their strategic doctrine on how the military and the party relate to each other.

I would not have predicted that he would have had a very compromising attitude on INF, that he would have taken the lead after essentially 15 years of Soviet stalling on MBFR to the point that the Soviets would have become more articulate than the West about the rationale for mutual arms control and mutual balance in Central Europe.

I would not have predicted that he would have been well on his way to meeting the three Chinese demands for rapprochement—a backing off of Soviet forces on the Chinese border, a pull-out from Afghanistan, and withdrawal from Cambodia.

Another aspect of the Gorbachev change of direction concerns the publicly reported changes in the status of Soviet forces. For example, the British, when Ambassador Abshire and I were there in the fall on a tour of NATO capitals, reported to us as did a number of NATO military people that they had noticed a reduced readiness, perhaps an 80 percent manning of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. Now those forces are their *creme de la creme*. Certainly they have been less than 100 percent manned in the past, but this seems to be the lowest manning rate they have had since I have been tracking it.

There is evidence of unit restructuring, of reorganization of the ground forces, including some of the satellite countries. The Hungarians have just gone through a significant restructuring which they are claiming is a portent of the new model of the Soviet army.

Moreover, we have had in the last 18 months widespread rumors, I think fueled by Soviet speculation themselves, first of possible Soviet unilateral reductions in Czechoslovakia, then in East Germany, and last week in Hungary.

Further, we have some strange events going on in the Soviet economy. It has been widely known that the Soviet military industrial complex has had first call on the best managing and the best resources. Now, incentives are being given for those managers to move into the civil sector, which is a surprise, and even more surprising is that they are taking up the offer and moving to the civil sector.

It will be hard for them to change that heavy industry with its unique design for military requirements into a civilian "butter" economy or "plow-share" economy. Nonetheless, it is interesting that the leaders, the people who made that military machine as ef-

fective as they could and who had all the perks, are having incentives to move more to the civil sector.

So with that by way of introduction, before I get into the key point of your questions, I also want to have a bit of historical background.

My prepared text starts with points on the Khrushchev era. I won't go through the details, but it is interesting to note how much Khrushchev cut the size of the Soviet army, withdrawing from Austria, Manchuria, Romania, Finland, and cutting units in Germany. At the time we in the West had underestimated how much Stalin had mobilized the Red Army so we tended to disbelieve the numbers and the evidence that Khrushchev was withdrawing.

The more I looked at the Khrushchev comparison to Gorbachev, the more I was struck with parallels as a reformer, a person focused on revitalizing the economy. It seems there is enough evidence looking back on the Khrushchev era that we may have missed an opportunity to constructively engage with Khrushchev and propel those reductions even further. That is the first conclusion, that we need to be very careful that we don't miss this opportunity. At the end, I will express why I am concerned that we might.

The second point I wanted to make concerns the second figure in the prepared text, a summary of some of the build-up that has gone on under Gorbachev's predecessors. In my view, much of what we see as "reform" is in a way Soviet frustration with the past 20 years of history.

Gorbachev inherited a bloated military infrastructure. The sheer size of the force requires large amounts of manpower, puts enormous strains on modernization. So we see the Soviets talking about the future and using arguments from the past. I think part of that is because they are reacting to an inheritance. I want to emphasize that.

Probably the biggest single change in the new Soviet doctrine has been their discussion of accepting a "defensive" defense.

The third figure in the prepared text, is based on Soviet sources as briefed to their officers and the General Staff Academy in about 1984 in which they were making the following arguments that in the event of war—and they clearly say that they wouldn't start the war—but if there were a crisis and hostilities were imminent, if there were hostilities, they would expect the following from the armed forces.

They would be expected on key selected areas of confrontation to seek out and destroy the opposing forces, control the opposing territory, make sure that the war was not fought on their territory and also destroy or retard with conventional means the defender's ability to respond with nuclear weapons.

In a perverted way, their strategic view of the Eurasian land mass, I think, could be interpreted as defensive, as saying, "Our area is sacrosanct and we are trying to provide this perimeter security." But that ends up being offensively driven. That is, they are invading other peoples' lands to get that defensive requirement. That is a strategy that Gorbachev inherited.

When they talk about a "defensive" defense *doctrine*, it is not *doctrine* in the way we think of it, training troops. Their view of

doctrine is the guidance the party gives to the military. What they are clearly signaling is that they have somehow changed this understanding of what the army is supposed to do on that Eurasian land mass in conventional operations. The problem is that they haven't been clear to us or to themselves as to just what this means.

They have said, "We like not to be seen as a threat to our neighbors, we would like not to have our forces on a hair-trigger requirement," but it is not clear they have given up the concept of preemption or given up the option in selected theaters of invading other territories.

The next chart in the prepared text is a summary of where Soviet conventional assets are. This is not to persuade you that the Soviets are more than ten-feet tall. The main intent is to illustrate what has been the key focus of their strategy, the heavy concentration of those conventional assets concentrated on one of those theater objectives—Central Europe.

Central Europe has been the dominant area that drives their military requirements. This is the theater worth fighting for, a theater where they believe the campaign would start and the campaign needs to be most offensive earliest and most decisively successful.

There has been a significant change not in what we have observed, not at the strategic level, but in the way they operationally use their forces.

The chart on page 5 of the prepared text shows the way in the mid-Seventies the Soviets were viewing their sweep across Central Europe, each army representing an arrow going across what they call multiple simultaneous axes of advance, assuming that the conventional campaign would last several days or a week before NATO initiated nuclear fire.

It is interesting that over the last decade there has been a significant growth in the amount of their exercises dedicated to the defense, I think. It is reflected in the amount of time that they are spending on the defense, which has approximately doubled. In the past they would spend 20 to 25 percent of their maneuvers on defense. Now it is close to 50 percent, but it has also expanded in terms of the level of units operating on the defense.

Nonetheless, of the last exercises observed, half the front is on the operational defensive while the other half is attempting to encircle NATO forces. So, you can have it both ways. One can say, "Watch our exercises. We are defensive kind of guys," and on the other hand, that has not necessarily reduced the perceived threat that Western military commanders see from that mass of Soviet forces.

Professor Snyder has written an excellent piece. He will be testifying before you in a few minutes. If you haven't read it, I highly commend it to you. It is a piece on the Soviets' arguments over the battle of Kursk in 1943.

It is fascinating because it is hard for us to imagine deciding American defense doctrine for the year 2000 and how our forces are going to be structured by means of an arcane discussion on the battle of Saipan or the Battle of the Bulge. Yet the Soviets think in these historical terms.

What is interesting about the battle of Kursk is that it has elements of all the arguments. There is the argument that it was a prepared, heavily defended area and that with modern technology, an attacking force could be robbed of its striking power. Some in the Soviet Union are using that argument to say, "We don't need to threaten the West. We can put that kind of defense on our own territory and not be in danger of suffering."

On the other hand, people can counter that argument and say, "Yes, but the way we defeated the Germans was a counter offensive." In fact, the Soviets contemplated a preemptive offensive before the German campaign. So one can have three arguments.

The point is that they are struggling at each level of the military art from strategy to operations to tactics to the specifics of technology and then back again trying in their own mind to think about where that doctrine goes. In my view, they have not finally decided that, and they themselves probably don't know where it will finally come out.

Back to the prepared text, figure seven shows where the ground-based nuclear assets of both sides in Central Europe are. What is interesting is the significant change in asymmetry. As late as 1979, we had a major advantage in a class of weapons—battlefield nuclear artillery. We saw it as inherently favoring the defender, and it was a potential bargaining point in any potential arms control negotiation. It was the last of the NATO asymmetries where we had a major technological advantage and they did not. That has now changed. I emphasize that because I think we have now lost that asymmetrical bargaining point when we think about future conventional negotiations.

The significance is that while the Soviets have been devoting more time to the defensive and their perception of the length of conventional operations, they have not forgotten the nuclear modernization. In my view, that is to provide an ability to keep us from having an incentive to go nuclear first. That isn't their perception of its utility for them. Nonetheless, it has been a massive investment that has gone virtually unnoticed in the West.

Another point concerns why Gorbachev is thinking about large-scale reductions. What is the pressure? It seems to me that there is one consistent theme when one sees the Soviet Navy spending 20 percent less time at sea, declining readiness of units, and complaints about the large structure of the Soviet army. It is essentially the same as Khrushchev's problem, primarily the amount of manpower required to fuel that size of Soviet army.

The manpower problem is compounded because of the interest in having the brightest, youngest talent moving into industry when the Army wants to drag them off for two years of service before college, and it is compounded by the growing minority problem. Over 50 percent of the Soviet draftable cohort in a given year now are non-Russians. That compounds the training problems inside the military and also the Russian control.

There have been a number of press discussions of Soviet reorganization. The Hungarians have been going through it as well as the Soviets. It is possible that we will see the Soviets potentially drop the number of their divisions by as much as 30 percent over the next 20 years.

There are various ways they might make those reductions. In the current reorganization, they have invented what they call a corps concept, a unified army corps. There are several in the Soviet Union. Those were divisions made more and more powerful into a corps.

In the last year, the Hungarian Army took several divisions and made them into one of these corps. That is, it was a downgrading phenomenon.

Reorganization was a common theme in the Khrushchev period and was driven by two views of his. One—and I think a similar method is prevalent today—was a belief that there has been a revolution on the battlefield. For Khrushchev this was nuclear operations. Today it is advanced weaponry. Second, there was the constraint on manpower and resources and the need to have fewer units better equipped and more ready and better trained.

In thinking about conventional arms control, I want to warn you about three events that haven't gotten much attention in the history of the MBFR negotiations. One is that the Soviets lied to us, and we now know they lied to us, on the manpower issue.

It was probably wrong for us to try to get accurate numbers because everybody can get confused on manpower. Nonetheless, the Polish defectors who have come to the West after the crackdown on Solidarity brought out strong evidence that, in fact, there was an intentional Soviet-led Warsaw Pact attempt to lie to the West to try to cheat 150,000 men on their numbers.

That begs the question, why was that significant?

A second factor was the famous Brezhnev withdrawal of the Sixth Guards tank division from East Germany. To much fanfare, the unit was loaded up on trains. The division flag went back to the Western USSR and was outfitted with new men and new material. The men that had been forward didn't leave with the division. They were redirected to other units in Germany and the equipment was sent to other units in the forward area. It was a great effort and a sham.

The question one asks is, "Why did they go to all that effort when we hadn't asked them to move that division anyway?"

Having gone over my time, and Ted Warner has as much or more interesting things to say about Gorbachev than I, rather than go through the comments I was going to make on conventional arms control, I will hold those for the questioning period.

I would sum up by saying that on conventional arms control, the West has not met its own mandate made two years ago for bold new initiatives to the East on conventional arms control. We can't even get our act together to have a simple declaration of what it is we are trying to achieve. Given the current lack of leadership and the divisive positions of the Western Governments, I don't know how we are going to get there from here.

It seems it becomes disingenuous for the West to say to the Soviets, "You have to help accommodate our concerns by having conventional reductions," when we can't even articulate to them what we want from them, let alone when or how we might get together.

It seems to me it is bordering on an alliance—if not national—disgrace, that we haven't been able to get our act together. It has hurt us two ways, I think. We may miss an opportunity with the

Soviets, but this may not be an opportunity there to be had. Certainly we are going to miss an opportunity to inform our publics of why we have defensive forces, what things about the Soviet structure threaten us and why mere rhetoric doesn't make us feel better.

If we can't resolve that, it seems to me we are going to lose that very public debate that our own alliance support depends on.

Thank you.

[The statement of Mr. Karber follows:]

GORBACHEV and the Changing Soviet Conventional Threat

- I. Gorbachev Has Already Had A Significant Impact on Soviet Military
 - Formal Change in Soviet Doctrine (1st public change in 30 years)
 - Change in Soviet Arms Control Approach
 - Withdrawal from Afghanistan/Chinese Rapprochement
 - Reduced Readiness, Unit Restructuring, Rumors of Reductions
 - Military/Industrial Management Priority to Civilian Sector
- II. Past Soviet Military Experience is Frame of Reference for Future
 - There are many Similarities between Gorbachev and Khrushchev (Fig. 1)
 - Gorbachev Inherited a Bloated Military Establishment from Brezhnev (Fig. 2)
 - "New" Approach is Driven by Disenchantment with Lack of Success of "Old"
 - Soviet failure to reap Political benefit from Nuclear Buildup
 - Failure of Intervention in Afghanistan
 - Fear of continued Western reactive buildup and New Technology
- III. The "NEW" Soviet Doctrine: Change, Continuity and Contradiction
 - There is a Big Difference between Soviet and Western Definitions
 - The Soviets are Still Debating Implications of Change
 - 1) The ROLE of "the Offensive" in Future Strategy
 - Security on the EurAsian Perimeter: a Paranoid's Delight (Fig. 3)
 - Soviet Deployment: the Centrality of Central Europe (Fig. 4)
 - Growing Emphasis on Large Scale Defensive Operations (Fig. 5)
 - Offensive, Defensive, or Counter-Offensive (Kursk) (Fig. 6)
 - Soviet "Defensive Defense" is NOT same as in West
 - 2) The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Soviet Security
 - Emphasis on Mutual Nuclear Deterrence
 - Reduce/Remove US Nuclear Presence on EurAsian Periphery
 - Enforce Escalation Dominance on European Battlefield (Fig. 7)
 - 3) The Size and Structure of Soviet Conventional Forces
 - The Driving Impact of Limited Manpower (Fig. 8)
 - Focus on Army Restructuring and Readiness
 - Ambiguities in Reorganization
 - Conversion to the UNIFIED ARMY CORPS? (Fig. 9)
 - 4) Open Questions:
 - Modernization and the Military Share of Resources?
 - Reduction of Forward Forces in Eastern Europe?
- IV. Implications for Conventional Arms Control
 - Cannot Ignore Soviet Pattern of Misleading and Maskirovka in MBFR Manpower Data, Phony Division Withdrawal (Fig. 10) , Troop Rotation
 - There are Pro's and Con's in New "Atlantic to the Urals" Negotiations (Fig. 11)
 - The West Still Does Not have a Coherent Approach
 - Need to Focus on: Asymmetrical Cuts in
 - Destabilizing Soviet Ground Forces in Central Europe (Fig. 12)
 - Best Proposal to Date is that of Sen. Nunn (Fig. 13)

Deja Vu: Military PERESTROIKA in the Khrushchev Era

Political Reform

- Reversal of Domestic Repression
- Major Party Restructuring
- Economic Reform
- Emphasis on Enhanced Production
- Initiated East European Liberalization
- Stressed Peaceful Coexistence
- Opened Dialogue with West (Spirit of Geneva)
- Advocated Military to Military Talks

Military Restructuring

- Instituted Radical Change in Military Doctrine
 - "Nuclear Revolution"
- Cut Size of Soviet Military by 40% (almost 2,000,000 men)
- Soviet Troop Withdrawals/Reductions

| | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|--------------|
| - Austria (negotiated) | 2 divisions |
| - Manchuria (unilateral) | 4 divisions |
| - Mongolia (unilateral) | 5 divisions |
| - Rumania (unilateral) | 2 divisions |
| - East Germany (unilateral) | 2 divisions |
| - Finland (unilateral) | 1 division |
| - Reduction of interior units to cadre/mobilization bases | 20 divisions |

Total Reduction 36 out of 175 divisions

The Downside

- Military Intervention in Eastern Europe
- Supported "Wars of National Liberation"
- Major East/West Confrontations
 - Missile Threats '56, '57
 - Berlin '58-'61
 - Cuban Missile Crisis '62
- Heavy Investment in Military Revolution
 - Nuclear Weapon/ICBM/Space Development
 - Restructuring of Army for Mobile Warfare
 - Modernization of Navy/Air Force
- Tension with Military
 - Zhukov coup attempt
 - Internal Debates/removal of CnC Ground Forces
 - Military supported Khrushchev Removal

**GORBACHEV's MILITARY INHERITANCE:
THE BREZHNEV MILITARY BUILD-UP
1963-1983**

| | <u>1963</u> | <u>1983</u> | <u>CHANGE</u> <u>1963-1983</u> |
|----------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------------------------|
| ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER (THOUS) | 3,300 | 4,644 | + 1,344 |
| STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES | | | |
| ICBMs | 90 | 1,398 | + 1,308 |
| SLBMs | 107 | 969 | + 862 |
| ICBM/SLBM Warheads | 200 | 7,727 | + 7,527 |
| Long-Range Bombers | 190 | 145 | - 45 |
| Medium-Range Bombers | 0 | 100 | + 100 |
| STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE FORCES | | | |
| ABM Launchers | 0 | 32 | + 32 |
| Interceptor Aircraft | 4,500 | 2,500 | - 2,000 |
| SAM Launchers | 4,800 | 9,500 | + 4,700 |
| THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES | | | |
| MRBM/IRBM Launchers | 200 | 600 | + 400 |
| Other | A Few | 8,018 | + 8,000 |
| LAND FORCES | | | |
| Army/Ground Forces Manpower | 2,250 | 2,840 | + 590 |
| Army/Ground Forces Divisions | 140 | 190 | + 50 |
| Tanks | 35,000 | 50,000 | + 15,000 |
| AMPHIBIOUS FORCES | | | |
| Marine/Naval Inf. Manpower | 1? | 14 | + 13 |
| Marine/Naval Inf. Divisions | 0 | 1 | + 1 |
| Amphibious Lift | 0 | 28 | + 28 |
| TACTICAL AIR FORCES | | | |
| Fighter/Attack Aircraft | 4,000 | 4,225 | + 225 |
| Medium-Range Bombers | 1,000 | 575 | + 425 |
| NAVAL FORCES | | | |
| Aircraft Carriers | 0 | 5 | + 5 |
| Cruisers | 23 | 36 | + 13 |
| Destroyers | 124 | 64 | - 60 |
| Frigates/Corvettes | 13 | 176 | + 163 |
| Attack Submarines | 404 | 280 | - 124 |
| Carrier Aircraft | 0 | 60 | + 60 |
| Land-Based Bombers | 450 | 450 | ---- |
| MOBILITY FORCES | | | |
| Airlift | 1,065 | 780 | - 285 |
| Sealift | 873 | 1,664 | + 791 |
| EXTERNAL FORCES | 28 | 40 | + 14 |
| (Divs. Deployed outside USSR) | | | |

Data Adapted from John M. Collins, U.S.-Soviet Military Balance 1980-1985, p. 5.

"OFFENSIVE" DEFENSE IN SOVIET STRATEGIC PLANNING





Figure 3

*Soviet General Staff Academy (Voroshilov) Lecture Materials, 1973-1975, and as still presented in the mid-1980s see Lt. John Hines and Dr. Philip Petersen "The Changing Soviet System of Control for Theater War," Signal Dec. 1986.

Figure 4

The Deployment of Soviet Conventional Power



* Map excludes approximately 25 cadre/mobilization divisions at very low manning.

** Stocks not shown for Eastern Europe.


INCREASING ROLE OF DEFENSE IN SOVIET OFFENSIVE PLANNING

MULTIPLE SIMULTANEOUS AXES
MID-1970s



Adapted from Mark Urban, *Soviet Land Forces*, p. 106.

ENCIRCLEMENT EXERCISE
MID-1980s




Sources:
John G. Hines, "Soviet Front Operations in Europe - Planning for Encirclement," a report from a conference at Sundvollen, Norway, April 25-27, 1985.

Phillip A. Petersen and Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, "Soviet Encirclement Operations and NATO's Use of Operational Reserves in Central Europe," a report from a conference on new technologies and the economics of defense held at Málaga, Spain, June 2-4, 1984.

Figure 5

KURSK, 1943: A FRAMEWORK FOR CURRENT SOVIET DEBATE



CHANGE IN CENTRAL REGION GROUND-BASED NUCLEAR CAPABILITY 1978-1988

Figure 7



Figure 8

CORRELATION OF SOVIET MANPOWER LIMITATIONS AND FORCE RESTRUCTURING





Figure 9

SOVIET FORCE STRUCTURE OPTIONS

ARMY DOWNGRADE
(Hungarian Example)

UNIFIED
ARMY
CORPS

DIVISION UPGRADE
(Soviet OMG Example)



WHAT HAPPENED TO THE 6TH GUARDS TANK DIVISION? THE BREZHNEV PHONY WITHDRAWAL -- 1979




Figure 10

Figure 12

CENTRAL REGION IMBALANCE WILL REQUIRE LARGE ASYMMETRICAL CUTS IN SOVIET/WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL FORCES





Figure 13

REQUIREMENT FOR ASYMMETRICAL SOVIET FORCE REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE



V. Conclusions: Gorbachev and Conventional Arms Control

- Danger of Missing a Real Opportunity to Stop the Arms Race
- Danger of Misinterpreting Style and Rhetoric for Real Substance
- Danger in NOT Formulating an Aggressive Western Position on Conventional Arms Control in Europe:
 - Miss an Opportunity to Test if Soviets are Really Serious
 - Fail to Inform Western Publics of What is Really Required of the Soviets to Achieve "Mutual Security"

STATEMENT OF EDWARD L. WARNER, III, SENIOR DEFENSE
ANALYST, THE RAND CORP.

Mr. WARNER. I have submitted a paper for you and I don't plan to run through it in detail.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Warner follows:

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE AND
CONCEPTS FOR CONVENTIONAL WARFARE AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WEST

Statement of
Edward L. Warner III
The RAND Corporation

before
the Defense Policy Panel
of the House Armed Services Committee
July 14, 1988

Statement of
Edward L. Warner III
The RAND Corporation*

*The views I will express today will be my own; they do not necessarily represent those of The RAND Corporation or any of its research sponsors.

INTRODUCTION

By all indications the Soviets are presently embarked upon the most fundamental reexamination of their defense objectives and policies since the late 1950s and early 1960s when they adjusted their doctrine and forces to the widespread introduction of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems. The current ferment is being stimulated and supported at the highest political levels with Mikhail Gorbachev himself periodically articulating some of its most radical ideas. It features both organizational and substantive dimensions the ultimate resolution of which will most certainly have significant impact on the shape of Soviet defense policy and the process by which it is made in the years ahead.

BACKGROUND: DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE--1977-1984

The Soviets have long insisted that their military doctrine has two distinct aspects: a *political side* concerned with the prevention of war, the causes of war when it occurs, the classification of wars from a Marxist-Leninist perspective and the purported security objectives of the Soviet Union on the world scene, and a *military-technical*, or what we would call the *operational side* that deals with concrete measures to prepare for and, if necessary, conduct military operations in the event of war. For more than a decade the Soviets have insisted that their military doctrine is "essentially defensive." In a landmark speech delivered at the city of Tula in January 1977, Leonid Brezhnev made a series of assertions about the Soviet military doctrine that came to be known in the West as the "Tula line." This line, which was further elaborated by senior Soviet figures well into the 1980s, insists that:

- Soviet military doctrine is "defensive," that is, the Soviet Union threatens no one and will not initiate military operations against any other country.

- 2 -

- The Soviet Union seeks only parity, not superiority, in the military balance of conventional and nuclear capabilities vis-a-vis its adversaries.
- Nuclear war in the modern era would be unwinnable, resulting only in mutual suicide for all countries directly involved.
- The Soviet Union absolutely rejects a preemptive strategy that would incline the Soviets toward seeking to launch a disarming first strike at the very outset of nuclear war.
- The Soviet Union unilaterally pledges that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons and calls upon all other nuclear-armed states to make a similar pledge.

Most of the elements of the "Tula line" deal with the political side of Soviet military doctrine. With the exception of the "no preemption" pledge, these declarations tell us little about Soviet concepts for the conduct of warfare with the use of either conventional or nuclear weapons.

The limited meaning of the declaration that Soviet military doctrine had a "strictly defensive orientation," as far as the Soviet military was concerned, was revealed in a statement made in 1981 by Marshal Ogarkov. The then Chief of the General Staff stated that in the event of an attack on the USSR the Soviet Armed Forces would undertake "resolute actions," including "not only defensive but modern offensive operations."¹ Col Gen V. Karpov, writing in the confidential General Staff journal *Military Thought*, expressed a similar view. After stating that Soviet aims were "strictly defensive" Gen Karpov asserted that this "in no way means that the Soviet Armed Forces will conduct only defensive operations." He went on to say, "only active, decisive operations...can lead to victory" and "a most important principle of waging war is the active, offensive character of strategic operations."²

¹Marshal N. V. Ogarkov, "For Our Soviet Motherland: Guarding Peaceful Labor," *Kommunist*, No. 10, October 1981, p. 85.

²Col Gen V. N. Karpov, "On the Theory of Soviet Military Strategy," *Voyennaya mysl'* (Military Thought), No. 10, October 1979, p. 19, cited

The Theater Strategic Operation

At the same time that the Soviets were seeking to put a benign public face on their military activities and intentions, less reassuring developments were occurring with regard to the military-technical/operational side of Soviet military doctrine. Over the past decade, the Soviets have been engaged in a comprehensive effort to upgrade their operational concepts, organizational arrangements, and military capabilities for the conduct of modern war. Specifically, the Soviets undertook a series of measures designed to acquire the wherewithal to conduct large-scale, high-speed offensive operations, preferably with conventional weapons but, if necessary, with nuclear forces, in several key theaters of military operations around the periphery of the USSR and in Eastern Europe.

The most important of the new organizational arrangements are designed to support what Marshal Ogarkov has called "a strategic operation in a theater of military operations." These include:

- The creation in peacetime of four new permanent "high commands of forces" (*glavnokomandovaniye voisk*) to plan and, if required, direct multi-front campaigns in theaters of operations that cover Central and Southern Europe, Southwest Asia, and the Far East.
- A major reorganization of the Soviet Air Forces in the early 1980s that created five "air armies of the Supreme High Command (VSK)," four of which are postured to support theater campaigns in Europe and in Asia.
- A reorganization in the early 1980s of Soviet Air Defense Forces, which was designed to provide greater flexibility in the employment of fighter-interceptors and mobile, ground-based, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) for either the defense of the Soviet homeland or for the protection of Soviet forces conducting offensive operations beyond the frontier.

in Raymond L. Garthoff's superb detailed review of the latest debate in Moscow about Soviet defense policy, "New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine," *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 1988, p. 147.

- 4 -

- The resurrection of a branch of the Soviet Air Forces called "army aviation," which is now equipped primarily with armed helicopters, designed to provide aerial fire support directly to the Ground Forces.
- The creation of new Ground Forces formations, including armor-heavy *operational maneuver groups* designed to support rapid penetrations deep into the enemy territory and *air assault brigades* to carry out heliborne attacks against critical targets in the enemy's rear to assist in the conduct of theater operations.

During the early 1980s the Soviets also steadily developed the key components of their doctrinal blueprint for the "theater strategic operation." These operations were then and remain today designed to repel an initial enemy attack and launch a decisive theater-wide offensive. The Soviets plan and would greatly prefer to fight such an offensive solely with conventional weapons. They recognize, however, that any major operation against the forces of their adversaries that possess nuclear weapons would be conducted under the constant threat of nuclear escalation. Consequently, their doctrine includes preparations for the use of chemical or nuclear weapons to prosecute their theater campaign.

The major components of the theater strategic operation to be fought, if at all possible, solely with conventional weapons, are:

- An initial *ground defensive* in the theater that resists and eventually halts the enemy's anticipated opening attack. The late 1970s and early 1980s saw a gradual increase in Soviet attention to defensive operations and actions in their military-technical/operational writings. Yet the attention to defensive activities remained very much less than that devoted to the conduct of the offensive.

- An *air defense* or *antiair operation* that integrates fighter-interceptors with ground-based SAMs and antiaircraft artillery conducting air defense operations over the Pact rear and a series of attacks against enemy air bases to defeat the enemy's opening air offensive.
- An armor-heavy, Soviet *blitzkrieg counteroffensive/offensive* designed first to expel the enemy from friendly territory and then to drive on to rapidly complete the defeat of his armed forces and occupy his territory. This high-speed offensive relies upon the massing of vastly superior artillery and armored forces at selected sectors of the front to break through the enemy's defenses. It also calls for the rapid introduction of follow-on echelons to exploit successful breakthroughs by driving deep into enemy territory.
- An *air operation* involving a series of massed raids carried out over several days by large numbers of fighter-interceptors, fighter-bombers, medium bombers, and conventionally armed tactical ballistic missiles in an effort to neutralize the enemy's air capabilities, to gain clear-cut air superiority, and to draw down his nuclear capabilities during the conventional phase of war.
- A series of *assault landings* in the enemy rear mounted by airborne, heliborne, amphibious and *spetsnaz* (special forces) formations against selected high-leverage targets prior to the achievement of decisive breakthroughs at the front.
- *Naval operations* that provide fire support for amphibious landings on seaward flanks and seek to neutralize the force projection capabilities of US battle groups and to disrupt the flow of supplies and reinforcements from the US into overseas theaters.

RECENT CHANGES IN SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE: 1985-1988

The Gorbachev period has been marked by an increasingly active discussion of Soviet basic national security policy objectives and of Soviet military doctrine. Much of this discussion has centered on the concept of "reasonable sufficiency." Mikhail Gorbachev first introduced this concept in the fall of 1985 and mentioned it again during his major address to the 27th Party Congress in February 1986 when he stated that the Soviets favored "restricting military potential within the bounds of reasonable sufficiency." The idea lay largely dormant over the next year before a spate of commentaries on the concept began to appear in the late spring and summer of 1987, which have continued ever since.

The Rise of the "Institutchiki"

The recent ferment in Moscow regarding fundamental directions in Soviet national security policy has a very important organizational dimension. Over the past 50 years the professional military has been solely responsible for the development and analysis of proposals regarding various aspects of the Soviet defense effort. The senior civilian leaders who sit on the Politburo have, of course, long made the decisions about the magnitude of the defense budget, the size and structure of the armed forces, and the content of Soviet military doctrine. Yet the alternatives from which the Politburo has been able to choose have long been drafted and analyzed by the "brain" of the Soviet military establishment, the General Staff. Developments in Moscow over the past several years, which are being accelerated by the ongoing debates over "reasonable sufficiency" and the character of future Soviet defense policy, have begun to challenge this long-standing process.

The 1980s have witnessed the emergence of a group of civilian specialists on national security issues with apparently growing ambitions to play a significant role in shaping Soviet military policy. These civilians work largely within the institutes of the Academy of Sciences, in particular its leading foreign affairs institutes in

Moscow--the Institute of World Economics and International Affairs (IMEMO) and the Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada (IUSAC). This group includes a number of veteran civilian academics and retired military officers such as Evgeniy Primakov, Vitaly Zhurkin, Aleksei Vasil'yev, Roald Sagdeyev, Yevgeniy Velikov, Lt Gen (Ret.) Mikhail Mil'shteyn, and Maj Gen (Ret.) Vadim Makarevsky, as well as a rising new civilian generation, including Andrei Kokoshin, Aleksei Arbatov, Andrei Kortunov, and Igor Malashenko.

The civilians active in these efforts have acquired their expertise in contemporary defense matters largely through their involvement over the past 10 to 15 years in the study of Western defense policies and of arms control issues. Their work on the latter has increased significantly in recent years due to a series of studies produced first under the aegis of the Scientific Research Council on Problems of Peace and Disarmament established in 1979 and, more recently, under the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat, which was formed in May 1983.

Until very recently the work of these civilian specialists was concentrated on the analysis of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive forces, an area where useful analysis can be carried out without an extensive background in military affairs. They have, for example, recently produced credible studies on strategic stability between the superpowers under various strategic force reduction configurations³ and on potential US-Soviet arms interactions should the US deploy a space-based ballistic missile defense system.⁴

Over the past year they have begun to turn their attention to the analysis of theater ground force operations as well,⁵ an area where the

³R. Sagdeyev, A. Kokoshin et al., *Strategic Stability Under the Conditions of Radical Nuclear Arms Reductions*, Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat, Moscow, April 1987.

⁴Ye. Velikov, R. Sagdeyev, and A. Kokoshin, *Weaponry in Space: The Dilemma of Security*, Mir Publishers, Moscow, 1986.

⁵A. Kokoshin and V. Larionov, "The Battle of Kursk from the Standpoint of Defensive Doctrine," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniye* (The World Economy and International Affairs, hereafter cited as *MEMO*), No. 8, 1987, pp. 32-40; A. Kokoshin, "The Development of Military Affairs and the Reduction of the Armed Forces and Conventional Arms," *MEMO*, No. 1, January 1988, pp. 20-32.

Soviet military has long enjoyed a monopoly of expertise. Due to the inherent complexities of theater warfare analysis, useful studies of alternative conventional force postures will certainly be more difficult for the civilian specialists to carry out. The Soviet General Staff is unlikely to look favorably upon receiving analytical "assistance" from a group of civilians on military operational matters, particularly those associated with theater warfare.

One should, of course, not overstate the significance of these developments. The professional military apparently continues to maintain control over detailed information on Soviet and foreign military forces and remains the primary formulator of the military-technical side of Soviet military doctrine. Moreover, the General Staff reportedly provides analytical support to the Defense Council, the subcommittee of the Politburo responsible for defense matters. Nevertheless, Mikhail Gorbachev is strongly challenging prevailing security concepts and encouraging innovative thinking about these matters. Politburo member Aleksandr Yakovlev and senior party secretary Anatoly Dobrynin have each called publicly for an increased role by civilian international affairs specialists and natural scientists in the analysis of foreign and defense matters⁶ and a group of talented and ambitious Soviet civilian academics appears to be stepping forward to accept this challenge.

Reasonable Sufficiency: The Theater Conventional Dimension

Soviet explorations of reasonable sufficiency have examined its application to both the strategic nuclear balance between the superpowers and the theater conventional balance between the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Soviet discussions of reasonable sufficiency in the European theater have been muddled somewhat by a vigorous Soviet campaign to characterize their military doctrine and that of their Warsaw Pact allies as "fundamentally defensive," which has been carried on over the past year or so as well.

⁶A. Yakovlev, "The Achievement of a Qualitatively New Condition of Soviet Society and Social Sciences," *Kommunist*, No. 8, 1987, p. 18; A. Dobrynin, "For a Nuclear-Free World Toward the 21st Century," *Kommunist*, No. 9, 1986, pp. 19, 27-28.

Initial formulations regarding reasonable sufficiency or simply "sufficiency for defense," as the Soviet military prefers to call it, with regard to theater conventional forces simply equated sufficiency with the current Soviet/Warsaw Pact force posture which was described as adequate "to repulse aggression" and "to reliably ensure the collective defense of the socialist community."⁷ Over time, however, the emphasis regarding reasonable sufficiency in the theater has been shifted from a present to a future orientation. Increasingly it has come to be associated with an aspiration to reconfigure radically the military forces of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact so that neither side would be capable of executing a successful surprise attack on the other or of mounting offensive operations. This objective has sometimes been described as a cooperative transition on the part of the opposing alliances to "nonprovocative defense" or "defensive defense" postures, making use of a phrase that the Soviets have borrowed from theorists associated with peace and disarmament circles in Western Europe.

There has been little debate among Soviet commentators regarding these extraordinary future goals. Military and civilian spokesmen alike have embraced these utopian objectives despite the fact that they clearly run directly counter to the long-standing offensive tradition in Soviet military-technical/operational doctrine and would call for the scrapping of the series of conceptual and organizational innovations introduced over the past decade, discussed previously, that are designed precisely to support a theater strategic offensive operation fought with conventional weapons in theaters around the USSR.

When pressed for details regarding what a "reasonably sufficient" posture in Central Europe might look like, Soviet civilian analysts have readily admitted that they are in the very earliest stages of exploring this concept. The Soviet civilian proponents of "reasonable sufficiency" are seeking to develop a stability concept that can be applied to conventional forces comparable to the "unacceptable damage" threshold they are using to define strategic stability in the US-Soviet nuclear balance.

⁷Army General D. T. Yazov, *Pravda*, July 27, 1987.

A More "Defensive" Doctrine?

The renewed and much increased effort to convince the world of the fundamentally "defensive" character of both Soviet and Warsaw Pact military doctrine also dates from early 1987. It began with a formal statement that was issued following the conclusion of a meeting of the Pact's Political Consultative Committee in Berlin in May 1987. In this, the leaders of the Warsaw Pact member states declared that "the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member states is strictly a defensive one."⁸ A major theme within this campaign has been the claim that this decidedly defensive orientation is not simply the central feature in the political aspect of Soviet military doctrine but that it has already begun to be reflected in the content of the Pact's military-technical doctrine and in the structure of Soviet forces and their training as well.⁹

While the Soviet military leadership has joined in on the chorus of praise for the Soviet Union's "new defensive doctrine," they have also registered a very significant reservation. Several senior Soviet military commanders have emphatically pointed out that the defensive orientation of Soviet/Pact doctrine does not rule out counteroffensive operations against the aggressor. Thus, Army General A. I. Gribkov, the Chief of Staff of the Joint Forces of the Warsaw Pact, stated in an interview last September that in the process of repulsing aggression, the Soviet Armed Forces "will also conduct "counteroffensive operations."¹⁰

Army General D. T. Yazov, who was apparently handpicked by Gorbachev to become Minister of Defense in the wake of the Rust affair

⁸"On the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact Member States," *Pravda*, May 31, 1987.

⁹Cf. Marshal S. F. Akhromeyev, "The Doctrine of Preventing War, Defending Peace and Socialism," *Problemy mira i sotsializma* (Problems of Peace and Socialism), No. 12, December 1987, p. 26; Col Gen M. A. Gareyev, "Prevention of War," *Krasnaya zvezda*, June 23, 1987.

¹⁰Interview with Army General A. I. Gribkov, "Doctrine of Maintaining Peace," *Krasnaya zvezda*, September 29, 1987.

- 11 -

in May 1987, echoed this sentiment. Yazov asserted that "it is impossible to rout an aggressor with defense alone" and went on to state that Soviet forces "must be able to conduct a *decisive offensive*" that will take "the form of a counteroffensive."¹¹

This critical caveat that offensive operations are fully consistent with a defensive doctrine provides the Soviet military with an escape clause that allows them to continue to develop offensive concepts and capabilities despite their alleged devotion to a "particularly defensive" doctrine.

Senior Soviet commanders have also been involved in a pointed public dialogue with civilian analysts (and possibly a more discrete debate with top political leaders) regarding how the Soviet Union should reduce and restructure its theater forces to meet the "sufficiency" objective. Specifically, senior military spokesmen have vehemently rejected the suggestion from three civilian academics last fall that the Soviet Union should consider substantially cutting its overall troop strength unilaterally, as Nikita Khrushchev had done in the late 1950s, and thus substantially enhancing Soviet security rather than waiting to negotiate mutual force reductions with the West.¹²

A few months later, Army General I. Tretyak, the commander in chief of the Air Defense Forces, harshly rejected this suggestion. He described Khrushchev's troop reduction in the late 1950s as a "sorry experience" and a "rash step" which "dealt a colossal blow to our defense capacity."¹³

¹¹Army General D. T. Yazov, *Na strazhe sotsializma i mira* (On Guard Over Socialism and Peace), Voenizdat, Moscow, 1987, p. 34.

¹²V. V. Zhurkin, S. A. Karaganov, and A. V. Kortunov, "Reasonable Sufficiency--Or How to Break the Vicious Circle," *New Times*, No. 40/87, p. 14.

¹³Interview with General Ivan Tretyak, "Reliable Defense, First and Foremost," *Moscow News*, No. 8, February 21, 1988, p. 12.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MILITARY-TECHNICAL/OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE

Developments with regard to the *military-technical* side of Soviet military doctrine over the past few years appear to have been largely concentrated on making further improvements in Soviet concepts for conducting theater strategic operations with conventional weapons. This effort has been marked by a much more balanced treatment of the offensive and defensive aspects of such operations which has built upon the initial shift in this direction that began to appear in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Discussions of offensive operations and actions continue to draw the majority of the attention, but by a much narrower margin than was the case in the past.

Recent Soviet analyses of concepts for offensive operations have largely not broken new ground but rather involve further refinements in the several important conceptual and organizational changes that were introduced at the beginning of the decade. Thus, it is the growing discussion of defensive operations and actions that merits our scrutiny.

The trend toward greater attention to the defense is clearly evident in the increased space devoted to discussions of defensive "actions" at the tactical level in publications such as the Ground Forces' monthly, *Voyennyy vestnik* (Military Herald) and, for example, in the two new editions of *Taktika* (Tactics), edited by Lt Gen V. G. Reznichenko, that appeared in 1984 and 1987. It also shows up at the operational and strategic level in the detailed discussions of lessons learned from theater strategic defensive operations conducted during the Great Patriotic War that appear in the pages of *The Military-Historical Journal*.

Several articles have appeared which use historical cases in order to illuminate key aspects of defensive operations. These articles have emphasized that contemporary defensive operations like those of the past should be marked by a bold maneuver character and should combine stubborn defense of key terrain, making use of obstacles and fortifications, with powerful counterattacks by specially configured tank and motorized assault formations. One writer explicitly claimed

that modern defensive operations would be marked by "even greater dynamism and activity" than those of the past and would involve increased emphasis on rapid maneuver and flexibility. Some of these articles also make clear that the Soviets continue to view the strategic defensive as a "temporary, enforced type of military action," which is to be superseded by a vigorous offensive at the first opportunity.

The increased Soviet attention to defensive operations over the past decade probably reflects several factors. On the one hand, the Soviets are keenly aware that they failed to pay adequate attention to defense in the past. In addition, the Soviets have become much more concerned during the 1980s about what they see to be NATO's increasingly offensive doctrine as reflected in its adoption of the "follow-on forces attack" concept so strongly advocated by former NATO Supreme Commander General Bernard Rogers and in the US Army's commitment to its "Air-Land Battle" doctrine. They also appear to be greatly impressed by NATO's enhanced military capabilities due to the availability of additional formations, such as the US III Corps and West German territorial brigades, as well as its extensive force modernization efforts. Moreover, the Soviet military, proceeding on the basis of worst case assumptions, may well fear that, in the event of a major crisis that is leading to war in Central Europe, the Soviet political leadership will not take a timely decision that allows the Pact to launch a preemptive conventional offensive, thus compelling them instead to defend a large-scale NATO attack.

Finally, one must also note that throughout its history the Soviet High Command has been preparing contingency plans for major military campaigns that might arise in several separate theaters around the Soviet Union. It is reasonable to expect that should a future war break out in one or more of these large theaters the Soviets would almost certainly find themselves on the offensive in some sectors while simultaneously conducting predominantly defensive operations in others. This was certainly the case in the battles with the Nazi invaders during much of World War II. The General Staff must undoubtedly plan for a mix of offensive and defensive operations between and within theaters as it contemplates possible future wars.

Prospects for Conventional Forces and Doctrine

The likely course of Soviet policy over the next several years with regard to theater conventional forces is difficult to foresee. It is virtually certain that the political and military leadership as well as the emerging cadre of civilian defense analysts will all continue to claim that Soviet military doctrine is "strictly defensive." They will also likely continue to propose that NATO and the Warsaw Pact jointly reduce and restructure their forces in order to preclude surprise attack and eliminate the capability to conduct offensive operations, as called for by the "reasonable sufficiency" concept.

The prospects, however, that NATO and the Warsaw Pact will succeed in rapidly concluding an agreement that yields significant reductions in and a restructuring of the large and very capable theater forces on both sides do not appear all that promising. There will be substantial difficulties in resolving disputes about the existing balances in key weapons categories, in deciding what types of weapons will be the focus of reductions, and in determining the geographic scope of selected sublimits. NATO should most certainly develop arms reductions proposals for the upcoming "Atlantic to the Urals" conventional stability talks in Vienna that test Soviet rhetoric about the Warsaw Pact's willingness to agree to asymmetrical reductions focused on those weapons with the greatest offensive potential in order to produce a more stable situation in Europe. The Western proposals should seek to reduce substantially current Pact advantages in armor, artillery, and armed helicopters in Central Europe. In order to develop and maintain support among Western publics for this approach, NATO will need to make a much more convincing public presentation of its views regarding the character and magnitude of the current NATO-Warsaw Pact arms imbalance and of NATO's rationale for focusing reductions on particular types of weapons.

The Soviets have made clear that they will seek reductions at the new Vienna arms reduction talks in "strike" aviation, an area where they claim the West enjoys a marked advantage, and in tactical nuclear missile systems as the price for heavier Pact cuts in tanks and

artillery. The West should resist the Soviet demands on both counts. In the wake of the INF Treaty, which has raised concerns in some quarters about the credibility of the American commitment to extend its nuclear umbrella to the defense of Europe, the time is not propitious for further reductions in NATO's nuclear capabilities. Such reductions would inevitably fall heavily on US dual-capable tactical aircraft and tactical missile systems. In view of the immense complexities involved in developing an agreed data base regarding the current East-West conventional balance in Europe, the difficulties the Pact is likely to have in agreeing to reductions of the type discussed, and the problems of developing an adequate verification regime, we are unlikely to see rapid progress in the new Vienna arms talks.

The Soviets could, of course, choose to reduce their theater forces unilaterally, as some Soviet civilian specialists have suggested. They already claim to be thinning out some of their forces in the Far East. A dramatic move by Gorbachev to withdraw perhaps two to four Soviet divisions from those posted in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, or Hungary cannot be ruled out. Regardless of whether Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and the western portions of the USSR are reduced through negotiations or unilaterally, they will almost certainly remain large and highly capable for the foreseeable future. And despite protestations by the Soviets regarding the purely defensive orientation of their doctrine, the Soviet military will almost certainly continue to integrate a steady flow of improved weaponry into the organizational and conceptual framework for armor-heavy, combined-arms maneuver warfare that was reviewed above. This will continue to provide the Soviet Union with impressive capabilities for high-speed offensive operations in theaters around the USSR.

Concluding Observations

New political thinking in Moscow about security matters, as well as talk of reasonable sufficiency in military forces and a new defensive doctrine for the Warsaw Pact pose both a challenge and an opportunity for the West. Our challenge will be to respond seriously and constructively to Mr. Gorbachev's bold words and frequent arms control

proposals in a manner that seriously tests his willingness to translate them into concrete deeds. We must do this without weakening alliance cohesion or undercutting our essential collective defense efforts. Our opportunity will lie in the possibility that we can contribute to the further reduction of tensions, to a more cooperative relationship between East and West, and to a more stable military situation in Europe through the conclusion of additional operational arms control and arms reduction agreements.

The CHAIRMAN. Phil, do you agree with the point that Ted just made that looking for evidence of Secretary Gorbachev's and Soviet sincerity is probably not the right thing to do, that what you really want to do is test their sincerity with some proposals of our own?

Mr. KARBUR. Absolutely. I think you do want to look for evidence of their sincerity and the only way you can truly test it is by physical restructuring of their forces.

The CHAIRMAN. I take it that Ted's point is that the best way to find out if they are sincere is to test their sincerity with some proposals of our own.

If you are not going to do that and you are looking at unilateral moves, it seems a lot of these are ambiguous.

On the one hand, you can argue that the Soviets are being less threatening, but you can argue that it is in their self-interest to be doing what they are doing.

The Soviets are emphasizing defensive proposals, and maybe now they have more understanding of NATO's capability so they understand they have to give more attention in their exercises to their defensive phase there when the war begins.

It is not an unambiguous demonstration that they are interested in reducing their offensive or aggressive posture in the world.

Is there anything that unambiguous?

The one thing I thought about was moving managers from the military sector to the civilian sector.

I take it that traditionally the better managers are considered to have been in the military sector, that always did get higher priority.

If they are now giving incentives and moving these people into the civilian sector, it is hard to imagine how that will be helpful to the military in any way. I am wondering if that is not an unambiguous signal that Gorbachev is downgrading the military in order to get the benefits of that for his economy.

Mr. WARNER. I think there are broader signals. If the question is—Is Gorbachev under a severe resource strain?—Would he like to find savings from the military in order to underwrite the reequipping of the civilian sector of the economy, a key dimension of his overall economic reform—

The CHAIRMAN. Let me rephrase the question. Gorbachev is so interested in strengthening the domestic economy that he is willing at least in the short run—we won't say permanently, but he is at least in the short run, maybe 10 or 20 years—interested in actually reducing the Soviet Union's military capability in order to get those resources.

What is the unambiguous evidence?

We know he is interested in improving the economy:

QUESTION. Is Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership now under Gorbachev so interested in improving the economy that they are willing to make some kind of moves which actually, in a pure military strength sense, is weakening them in order to get the resources and the people to strengthen the economy?

What is the unambiguous evidence of that?

Mr. WARNER. The answer is that there isn't any unambiguous evidence yet. If anything, the trends are for more of the same and maybe even a little—

The CHAIRMAN. Or mixed.

You can say yes, he is doing this to strengthen the economy, but on the other hand, thinning the military ranks, streamlining it—

Mr. WARNER. Gorbachev hasn't gored the military ox much at all up to this point. Yet the very fact that they can have this discussion of "reasonable sufficiency," that civilians can articulate these new ideas and argue in public print with military officers about whether the Soviet Union ought to take unilateral cuts in its military forces or wait for negotiated cuts is significant. A few civilians have written, much to the chagrin of and prompting a response from senior military figures, that the Soviet Union shouldn't wait for negotiated arms control agreements before reducing its forces.

Mr. Khrushchev did it correctly, they say, in the late fifties when he released two million men from the Soviet armed forces because it was necessary for the Soviet economy and to enhance security.

The military responded to this argument in favor of unilateral cuts first in a veiled way in an article by Marshal Akhromeyev published last December. Then General Trechak responded more explicitly in February when he cited the specific Khrushchev example and said it had been disastrous for Soviet security.

As to whether there has been a concrete shifting of resources from the defense sector to the rest of the economy the evidence just isn't conclusive yet.

It seems to me that this debate in the Soviet press indicates that there is serious consideration in Moscow of both paths—unilateral cuts, modest or large, in the Soviet military or negotiated reductions, modest or large, that are reciprocally implemented by East and West.

But if your question is what has occurred yet with regard to resource shifts, my understanding from CIA estimates and the like is that there has been a little bit of an upturn in Soviet Defense spending—not a return to annual increases of 5 to 6 percent that occurred in the good old days of the sixties or mid-seventies, but an increase higher than the modest 2 percent growth of the late seventies and early eighties.

Nevertheless, Gorbachev is putting enormous pressure on the military through arms control activism, his stimulation of the doctrinal debate just discussed, and his *perestroika* campaign in which the military is being criticized for its internal mismanagement, its misuse of resources, and lots of other things.

If the cardinal question is, has Gorbachev made a concrete decision to shift priority from the defense to the civilian sector, that we can see reflected in resource allocation or in weapons procurement, the answer is no. In day-to-day operations, however, there is some tentative evidence of change. As Mr. Karber noted, over the last two years the Soviet Navy has cut down the tempo of its out-of-area operations and appears to be operating in Soviet coastal waters more than in the past. In addition, the fact that the manning of Soviet forces posted in the forward area (Eastern Europe) may have been reduced from 90 percent of total authorization strength to around 80 percent could reflect cost-cutting imperatives.

These moves may be significant. But on the whole, there are, in my view, no indications that Gorbachev has realized any large-scale cost savings in the defense area.

The CHAIRMAN. What would either of you say, if you were to look for the unambiguous—if Gorbachev wanted to, and if he were to convince the Soviet system that a shift in emphasis from the military to the economic was the desired path to take, and willing actually to weaken the military temporarily or permanently, what would you look for?

Would Phil's point about putting these military managers into the domestic sector, would that be a sign?

Would a sign of more defensive exercises, if they changed the doctrine—if they did change the resources—what would you have to see, either of you, in order to say, "Look, this is a situation in which the decision has been made to deemphasize the military in order to strengthen the economy"?

In other words, what would you have to see out there in order to make that conclusion yourself to convince you that this was the case?

Mr. KARBBER. For me, it would be a cut of half the Soviet forces deployed in Eastern Europe. When I see 13 Soviet divisions roll back into the interior, I am going to say, "Yes they are really serious."

They can just about halve that number forward for national interest and alliance politics and all kinds of things, a forward security screen under a defensive doctrine. They have about twice too much as they need, but they didn't always. Those forces were brought up to that strength intentionally by Stalin, just a couple of months prior to the Korean war.

So in the first five years after the war, they were content to have a substantially lower level—

The CHAIRMAN. What kind of numbers were they in that period?

Mr. KARBBER. In Germany they had 22 divisions. Roughly 12 of them were cadre'd, so they were a regiment instead of a division—they just had them on a very low manning level, so it was equivalent of half.

What Stalin did started about seven months before the Korean War and culminated a couple of months before. One of the reasons why Western intelligence saw Korea as potentially a feint in the East is because he brought the forces up to full manning and brought them up to combat readiness.

The United States was down to less than 100,000 troops in Europe and it was after the war scare that we brought the Seventh Army back and brought an additional four divisions over—at the time of Korea, we had one infantry division and three regiments.

It is interesting that both superpowers had lower manning levels and they came back up. Why is that such a river for them to cross? If the Soviets cut the Army in half but kept the forward forces in Central Europe backed up by a reasonable reserve that they have in the Western military districts, they would still pose a significant offensive threat to Central Europe, whether or not they had a defensive doctrine.

By having that requirement, the word "sufficiency" never stands by itself. It is not like balance or equality; sufficiency is sufficient to do what? What is the action that one is trying to accomplish?

As long as they keep a strong force in Central Europe, I think they will always be tempted to say we look easier prey in a crisis if they preempt while we are getting ready rather than taking a blow from us or waiting until we were fully ready and prepared.

I think it is an endless justification on their own side to compete qualitatively, if not quantitatively. To me, it is the driver.

When they are willing to cut that force back in peacetime, they will not have given up their security of the individual alliance or coalition members in a crisis—they could always bring other forces back—but they are also then signaling that they have given up the preemptive offensive because they will give us clear, unambiguous warning about redeployment.

Without that, Gorbachev can make cuts in other areas, in the size of the military, in the priorities of the military, and they are still going to have enough to give that offensive cutting edge, if not unit or piece of equipment for piece of equipment, then at least with equality with weapon technology close enough so that the numbers count and the offensive initiative is potentially decisive.

Mr. WARNER. On the shifting of veteran managers out of the defense-industrial sector, this is not the first time that has been done, either.

Again, during the Brezhnev period, there was some shifting of such managers from the defense sector to other parts of the economy.

Traditionally, if one was trying to back up the economy and realized that you had put many of the most talented personnel at the top working in the defense area, you could move them across to the nondefense sector in hopes of improving performance there.

I think this approach is part of the overall effort to try and revitalize the economy as a whole.

It is hard for me to see this measure as a sign of a serious weakening of support for defense. There are almost certainly talented successor managers behind those that have been transferred and these new managers who have been in the system for decades have simply moved up. Unless the Soviets change their fundamental system of allocations between the defense and nondefense sectors, the successor defense-industrial managers will be equally dedicated to putting out high quality military systems with the benefit of the best inputs in the Soviet system.

One thing the Soviets have done to try and improve the civilian economy has been in the area of quality control. One of the reasons the Soviets have better quality in the military economy is that the military customer has a quality control role with regard to weapons production.

Mr. WARNER. The Ministry of Defense has military representatives at the defense production plants that have the right to turn down systems if they are not up to specifications. Nobody does that for the poor Soviet consumer. He gets stuck with the shoddiest stuff you can imagine. About two years ago the Soviet leaders decided to create a State Acceptance Commission to play a similar

role in an effort to bring about higher quality in selected portions of the civilian economy.

So this idea of seeking to "learn from the military sector" is an important dimension of Gorbachev's economic reform strategy, but I fail to link it with a reduced emphasis on the military sector *per se*.

On the other question, what brings us full circle, I guess Mr. Karber and I are very much in agreement. The real proof of Soviet seriousness in reducing the defense burden would involve reductions and restructuring of the Soviet Armed Forces. One can then try to define the threshold for such substantial change. It would seem to be a force reduction involving many divisions, including some cuts in the forces posted in Central Europe where Soviet forces are most heavily concentrated. This gets back to what seems to be the position of the Soviet professional military on this question. They see the specter of such reductions being carried out unilaterally, and they are trying to lay down a marker in part to the West but very much to their civilian leadership as well, which says "Don't do this unilaterally."

Now, if Gorbachev has enough political power and he finds it important enough, he could, in fact, seek to initiate a major Soviet force reduction unilaterally. By the way, Mr. Khrushchev's record in this area was mixed. He initiated and followed through on two troop cuts in the late 1950's. He initiated and publicly announced a third troop cut in 1960. This last cut never got anywhere, in part because the East-West cold war broke out a bit more over the Berlin Wall and in part because the conservative resistance within the system was increasing. There was agreement that they had perhaps been overstaffed to a certain extent in the late 1950's, but there was not agreement to take that additional 1.2 million-man cut that Khrushchev proposed in 1960.

I am not optimistic that Mr. Gorbachev will be able to pull off large-scale restructuring reductions unilaterally, in light of his political fortunes of the last year. The Soviet military is insisting that, if this kind of reduction is to occur, it must be done reciprocally. I think there is an opportunity for the West to try to engage them in serious negotiations leading toward such reciprocal reductions.

The CHAIRMAN. Tell me about Khrushchev. I was not aware in retrospect how extensive Khrushchev's reduction in forces was. Was this known publicly at the time that it occurred? What were we saying about it at the time?

Mr. KARBER. The first one was Austria. The West had about three battalions and the Soviets two divisions in Austria. For those who say the Soviets will never accept an asymmetrical cut, they took about a six-to-one ratio there. And that was the first negotiated cut.

Khrushchev then announced some large manpower cuts. The West had generally underestimated by about two million men how much Stalin had mobilized, and so we were starting, assuming a Soviet military structure of "X", when it was really "X" plus 50 or 60 percent. Khrushchev announces the first set of cuts, and we sort of looked for them. Those were focused primarily in Mongolia, and the Soviet Union was kind of hard to see.

The next set of cuts came in the group of Soviet Forces, Germany. Khrushchev pulled out several conventional artillery brigades and ten air defense artillery divisions which were sort of brigade-size air defense units. On the other hand, he replaced them with the first nuclear weapons and the first SAMs. So there was a tendency to sort of assume that was a trade—different units, but still the manpower was staying the same.

He then announced that was a second cut and people started saying, "Wait a minute, if we add up the first and the second, it is impossible because there won't be a Soviet Army left because he is cutting more than we thought he had to begin with." There was a general derisive attitude, you can look at it in the foreign relations of the United States documents. Western military writers tended to pooh-pooh it. It was generally thought that there were some cuts going on, but this was mostly propaganda.

But it got fairly serious when they pulled out of Manchuria, four divisions in Port Arthur; pulled out two divisions in Rumania, Finland and two out of Germany. What was not known, and there was a lag time because our collection was so poor then—it was dependent on floating balloons across the Soviet Union with cameras in them and the U-2s—we didn't know what the status of these units were in the interior, and so Khrushchev announced a number of them—and he actually gave a list of how many divisions he abolished. It wasn't until the early Kennedy Administration, the same people who had found the missile gap started looking at the large Soviet structure and said, "When was the last time we had a report that the 130th Guards division was really alive and well?" And they would go back to the files and see it was four or five years, and so they would then focus attaches, overheads, various collection means to figure out, whatever happened to the old 130th? And what they found, in retrospect, is that a number of those had in fact been turned into equipment holding units. A number were disbanded, some reduced to very small training establishments of a battalion or regiment size. The numbers of Soviets were then adjusted in the late Kennedy Administration, just about the time Khrushchev left.

So, by the time we sort of caught up to the sense of what he had done—now, having made Khrushchev out as a saint, I also said there were several down-sides to his reign, two of them. One was we went through probably the closest we ever came to strategic nuclear war. He was not shy about bandying the bomb about. Just because a guy is a reformer internally, and generally on the side of the angels—that is, de-Stalinizing things, trying to liberalize Eastern Europe—doesn't mean he can't be dangerous.

The second point is that Khrushchev, as Ted alluded, and I would just reinforce it, ran afoul of the military. We still don't know the whole stories of the Zhukov coup. For all we know, Zhukov was unceremoniously sacked. Khrushchev later told Eisenhower Zhukov had tried to rebel against him. There were massive internal Soviet military debates in 1960 and 1961. Penkovsky, probably one of the best defectors we ever had, was a colonel driven out of the Soviet Army and incensed because they had essentially retired him early, and this was his prime motivation for coming to

the West. At any rate, it was the military that greatly acquiesced in Khrushchev's removal.

So there are two down-sides we need to think about in Gorbachev. The man still has a strong coercive instrument at his disposal—it has not been disbanded yet—and the potential for a crisis is very significant. Second, he is vulnerable, and I think there is a point at which the military, although not by themselves, will resist being not only cut in size, but cut off from all resources and humiliated. I emphasize the last point, because to me, in getting ready for this hearing, what was striking about some of the recent Soviet discussions was how close the military were coming to being run through the gutter in terms of being saddled with the advice for going into Afghanistan, for instance, saddled with the advice of the need to introduce SS-20's in Europe and how Europe would fall before their knees completely.

So there has been strong castigation, much stronger than I expected to find, although maybe Ted will disagree. But given the Khrushchev experience, to sum it up, I think there are some dangers in that as well. The key to your question, though, is we basically didn't see it until it was too late. Essentially, Khrushchev in 1955 offered us the arms control settlement we had offered in the spring of 1950. By then, the world was different, and we weren't willing to take it, in terms of mutual disengagement from Central Europe, essentially our proposal in the spring of 1950.

So there is an importance to being timely. That doesn't mean, even knowing what we know now, we could have changed events in the Soviet Union.

The CHAIRMAN. Ted, anything to add?

Mr. WARNER. Yes. For the most part the reductions pushed by Khrushchev in the late 1950's took place. They were largely motivated by Khrushchev's belief that the military was too large as a result of the Stalin-inspired buildup of the early 1950s.

Second, Khrushchev was enamored with the nuclear weapons. He believed the nuclear revolution meant mass armies were no longer required. Ed Luttwak believes, on the basis of discussions with Soviet emigres, that a lot of those cuts fell disproportionately on officers serving in the artillery. The logic behind this focus was that the Soviets had come to believe that artillery firepower was no longer necessary because they were beginning to deploy tactical nuclear weapons that would provide the necessary fire support for military operations.

Remember the doctrinal revolution pushed by Khrushchev was based on an argument that any major war would be nuclear from the very outset. There was an entire doctrinal framework that went with this approach. It was noteworthy that Khrushchev tried, during his last four years in office, to go even further in the direction where this logic was leading him. He wanted desperately to reduce the size of the armed forces and spend more on consumer goods. He was continuously battling with what he called the "metal eaters," that is, the proponents of heavy industry and defense-industrial production.

At that time, when Khrushchev was still the First Secretary, he was thwarted by the pro-defense forces. This, among other things, led him to international gambles, including erection of the Berlin

Wall and the humiliating failure in the Cuban Missile Crisis, which ultimately produced the decline and fall of Nikita Khrushchev.

Interestingly, to go with my own story regarding the fate of the artillery branch of the Soviet ground forces, these elements were reinstated in the late 1960's and early 1970's. By the late 1970's and early 1980's they were reequipped with new modern guns, so that the accumulated Soviet military capability today is a truly dual-capable set of forces and doctrine. Today the Soviets have theater forces that can wage lengthy conventional war of a very modern character, carrying out offensive or defensive operations, although they continue to believe that the offensive is essential to the achievement of victory. It is a force that continues to be fully capable of nuclear operations as well. A few of the American students of this Soviet conventionalization or reemergence of the conventional option have intimated that Soviet preparations for nuclear war have disappeared. This is not the case. The Soviets have retained their nuclear preparations and simply added the conventional capabilities and concepts. That is the on-the-ground reality of Soviet military capability that we face today.

You were asking for signs of change on the Soviet defense scene. The very fact the new debate about Soviet national security policy is going on is in itself an important sign. We keep pooh-poohing the chance for change, and when Mr. Carlucci sees General Yazov and Admiral Crowe speaks with Marshal Akhromeyev, we push them to prove that their doctrine has really changed. Let's at least keep in mind the very fact they are talking about these matters has considerable importance. Some would say that all this discussion is purely propaganda. I don't believe this is the case. I believe it indicates there is a serious contemplation of change in Moscow. The task today is to see if they continue the debate and begin to move in the positive directions they have laid out. It is good to remind ourselves that most of what we've seen to date is simply discussion and debate, but the very fact that this debate is occurring is very noteworthy.

The CHAIRMAN. The Khrushchev period, the Khrushchev cut in the forces, Khrushchev's day was not I take it, not what Gorbachev wants to do, a cut in forces, because he wants to shift those resources to the economy?

Mr. WARNER. No, Khrushchev wanted to shift resources. It was very much that.

The CHAIRMAN. You were saying it had to do with doctrinal——

Mr. WARNER. It had both motivations. Khrushchev thought he could afford to divert investment from defense because he was implementing a revolution in military affairs made possible by the combination of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles of various ranges. He was convinced that he could rely on nuclear-tipped missiles as the centerpiece of his defense capability, and he claimed that the Soviet Union was in the lead in the introduction of these new capabilities.

But his other motivation was economic. The genius of Khrushchev, in comparison to the rest of his political contemporaries in the post-Stalin era, was that he recognized that the nation needed a respite from Stalinism. So he offered them "goulash commu-

nism." He was dedicated to trying to do something for the average Soviet citizen, and for a time he succeeded.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any evidence any of this had any impact on the economy?

Mr. WARNER. Yes. In that period the release of additional manpower to the civilian economy was very beneficial. Experts on the Soviet economy like Abraham Becker and others doubt that the release of manpower would have an immediate payoff for the Soviet economy of the late 1980's. Just the release of manpower could have real payoff and almost certainly did in the late 1950's and early 1960's, because the main Soviet strategy of economic development at that time was the so-called extensive strategy, that is, simply pouring more in puts into the economy. The Soviets had a serious manpower shortage then because of the losses during the war. So they could take reductions in the annual call-up of conscripts and translate that into an expanded labor force that had near-term payoffs. I am certainly no economist and I can't tell you about the specific payoffs of that period with any precision, but that was a period when Soviet economic achievements were generally thought as quite substantial.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the difference between the general resources and manpower and what kind of resources shift would you need now to make an impact on the economy?

Mr. WARNER. What the experts seem to be saying now is that the Soviets need to free up assets for capital investment in the nondefense sector. One of the bold pledges of the current five-year plan, one that is nowhere near being fulfilled, was a commitment to reequip much of Soviet industry. In order to get the necessary resources for this effort, the Soviets must avoid costly new defense investments. They would like, for example, to avoid costly SDI deployments. A strong motivation behind Soviet efforts to retain the ABM Treaty—and there are lots of other political dimensions to that question as well—is that they don't want to be spending multi-tens of billions of rubles per year on strategic defense deployment. This would be far more than the costs for ABM research, which is considerably cheaper.

So the Soviets would like to avoid costly force expansions and they are apparently entertaining the idea of force reductions as well. Such reductions could free more resources not in manpower per se though that would have some utility. The real resource savings would come over time through reductions in operating costs and in the avoidance of reequipment costs. The resources saved could then be redirected into reinvestment in the infrastructure of nondefense industries.

The CHAIRMAN. What does that tell you, what part of the defense budget would they look at to make their cuts?

Mr. WARNER. Everyone uses the familiar statistic, that the cost of the strategic nuclear forces on both sides represents about 10 to 15 percent of the overall defense budget. Costs associated with the general purpose forces take up the lion's share of each superpower's defense expenditures. So reductions in these larger forces would be most beneficial.

The CHAIRMAN. If you are not talking about general resources now but scientific engineering, scientific people, technical people, it

is the constraint. If you are saying it is different from the Khrushchev period, cutting divisions would help the economy in those days because it would pour more resources in, you had manpower shortages following the war, so freeing up manpower by demobilizing divisions would be the way you would go in the Khrushchev period to improving the economy.

What you are saying now is in order to improve the economy in the Gorbachev period, what you want to do is free up the scientists, the engineers and the technical people so that instead of working on SDI they can go to work on consumer products.

Mr. WARNER. I wasn't putting it that way.

The CHAIRMAN. Am I overstating your case?

Mr. WARNER. You are putting a little different edge on it. Let me try to respond to that side of it as well.

Interestingly, some people believe Mr. Gorbachev is seeking relief in the military-technical competition, that is, in the development and fielding of modern weaponry. I am not sure of that. In any case, I don't think he will be very successful in this effort. I am convinced, no matter how bold and successful we are in concluding ambitious arms reduction agreements over the next several years, the residual forces, strategic and general purpose, will remain large and capable and will be undergoing substantial modernization.

I think as far as freeing the scientific cadre from working on improvements in everything from ground forces equipment to avionics and to strategic ballistic and cruise missiles, I doubt whether there is a significant payoff possible in this area. What I was trying to argue was if you got large-scale demobilizations, then you could save on reequipping them and on their annual operating costs; those could translate into resources saved, and those resources could be invested in plant infrastructure and the like.

Even with regard to the SDI, if they are spared the enormous costs of near-term deployment, they will almost certainly continue substantial SDI research. They will still be faced with uncertainties as to what direction the United States is going to take in the combination of strategic offense and defense. And I don't think we are going to abandon our offensive modernization efforts and research in the ballistic missile defense area either. The United States may not ever deploy the SDI, but we will, by all signs, continue to carry out a vigorous research effort for at least the next several years. I am convinced that they are not going to get relief on the scientific investigation front. If they succeed in avoiding SDI deployment, they will avoid the enormous costs of space-based battle stations and the costs of deploying offensive countermeasures and of specialized defense suppression systems, but substantial R&D in these areas will be carried out.

The CHAIRMAN. John, would you like to ask questions?

Mr. ROWLAND. I would like to follow up on that last line of questions.

Is there any evidence the Soviets are moving in that direction? Is there any evidence they are going to reduce some of their strategic, R&D or procurement? Is it all rhetoric at this point, or is it planned? In your opinion, is Gorbachev floating out trial balloons to see what will fly in the Soviet Union and/or what will fly with

regard to the relationship with the United States or even worldwide opinion? Is everything right now just floating around out there as he tries to test what really could work and what his people really want?

Mr. KARBER. I think the answer is yes, but that is not a denial of the proposition. The chairman asked a few minutes ago, "How would he go about, if he really was serious, how would he go about things?" And to sort of sum up points Ted was making, he probably would do just about what he has done. The first thing he would do is get together with the military and say, "Boys, there is a revolution out there." All of a sudden all the conventional wisdom, no pun intended, is suddenly out, is open for challenge. You can't say, "Hey, there is a whole new dramatic thing happening here and the old ways don't apply, we have to re-think this, boys," and not have that happen.

They say, "Yes, Boss, there is a revolution coming on here." The next step is to sit down and say, "What are our new policy precepts in terms of doctrine"—this is getting your liturgy right.

The third step would be to have a party conference and essentially try and get your party political ducks in a row.

Now during that process, decisions you make, I would think, are primarily negative. That is, the military—remember, Gorbachev inherited 40 Soviet divisions deployed out of the Soviet Union. When Brezhnev took over from Khrushchev, there were only 26. So there is more Soviet external presence, and by Khrushchev's figures they cost twice as much. But regarding a decision-maker in that early phase, his powers are negative. The army comes in and said, "Boys, we need another 100,000 men to clean up Afghanistan." The decision-maker says, "I don't think it is going to be available this year, I have got pressures from the economy." Marshal Akhromeyev comes in and says, "There is the new reconnaissance/strike complex. It is the latest thing in modern warfare, I would like three of them, please." He says, "I would have sent this new machine tool company to you but we just committed them for the production of the following devices, and I can't take them off line."

There is a lot of ways Gorbachev can play in areas that are significant but very hard to see from the outside. I am not trying to make a case for this great reform. I am saying, if you were going to make a series of significant changes, I think you would do what he has done. At some point, there is a cross-over where he has gotten all the marginal returns from his little negatives, and now he has to start looking for some deep issues.

I personally think manpower is a driver because of the sheer size of the forces, because of the large officer cadre required for this huge training establishment. That is, the number and need for officers, for trained and college-educated people, is out of proportion to the number of draftees going through it the way they have structured the system. Moreover, there is the minority problem. Over half of the population is non-Russian.

So I think there is a manpower crunch. But in deference to Ed's point of view, I would also say it is more on the negative side, that is, not releasing more manpower as opposed to Gorbachev going out and looking for that as a major economic saving. To me, the big economic savings in terms of getting his economy going is what the

military probably has the biggest demand on, and that is the heavy machine tool industry. Because they make the machines that can recapitalize that infrastructure, not that you are going to take some truck works or tank factory and turn it into making refrigerators, but it can produce the machine tooling to do electronic robotics for other kinds of civilian-oriented modernization. So there is a potential saving there which I think is fairly large.

In the short term, that does not necessarily have to be at a heavy cost, at least in the next four or five years, to the military's favorite toys. That is, in many of those more exotic systems, particularly in the area of munitions, as opposed to platforms, in those it seems to me we won't see necessarily a dropoff.

Mr. ROWLAND. If I close my eyes and listen to your answers, I can almost sense or compare it to the decision-making process of the United States. You talk about military officers, they want "X" amount of men or machinery. Gorbachev is feeling out political pressure, we are led to believe, along with his own thoughts, plans and ideas for the future, and it sounds like he is trying to balance all these factors to come up with something that is going to make him look good and something he thinks will be acceptable. Is that a fair statement?

Mr. KARBER. I think every leader of every country, no matter how bellicose or how aggressive, ends up making those kinds of decisions. It is interesting, reading Albert Speers' memoirs of how little Hitler mobilized the German economy because he didn't want to take nylon away from German women lest they would revolt. It wasn't until 1944 they closed down cosmetic factories and turned them into ammunition production because he didn't want to offend German womanhood. So even sort of bellicose people will end up having priorities—they have to make a choice.

I don't want to turn Gorbachev into a Presidential candidate. The thing is, he is dedicated to making their system work. He doesn't feel that the system is working, and he sees that the military have a high call on the priority of many of the elements that do work reasonably well. He sees in the reasonably near term those assets the military have called on could be the fulcrum point to try to leverage greater movement out of that economy.

Mr. ROWLAND. Final question. Gorbachev works very hard at giving the impression he is responding to what the people want. What is the real drive there? From your examinations and your studies, do you sense there is any real drive or push from the people, or are they just looking up and, as a matter of fact, saying, let's straighten up the economy; we have got food lines and all these other problems, I don't care how you do it, but we need some economic relief? I think Gorbachev is posturing himself beautifully. He is giving the impression that is what his people want, and he is responding to his people in a democratic process, and he will be making these changes.

Back in the fall of 1985, as you pointed out, he talked about reasonable sufficiency. I think he is fishing to see what kind of feedback he gets and can work it out almost in a way to posture himself to look like he is responsive. Is that an off-the-wall idea?

Mr. WARNER. I think, in general, it captures very much the situation Mr. Gorbachev faces. He comes to power with his central

mandate being an overwhelming consensus throughout the Soviet society that the system isn't working. The system is in a state of real crisis. And Mr. Gorbachev's rhetoric about this crisis has gotten increasingly harsh and pointed. The Soviets are saying hostile things about their own economy that one used to find only from the strongest conservatives and harshest critics in the West. They are outdoing us in the criticisms of what has happened in the past. They have gotten extremely biting about the legacy of Mr. Brezhnev, which they describe as the legacy of stagnation.

There is no doubt they face multiple crisis centered on an economy which is not suited to the postindustrial revolution. It consists largely of smokestack industry and not very efficient smokestack industry at that. They have an agricultural system that is shackled by collectivization that hasn't worked well in the past and continues to perform poorly. Their rate of technological innovation is terrible.

Mr. Gorbachev's motivations then are both international and domestic. Internationally, he stated them best at a major conference just a few months before he became General Secretary. In December of 1984, he said, "Comrades, we have got to reform this system if we are going to enter the 21st century in a manner becoming a superpower."

The Soviets are keenly aware that if they do not bring about a dramatic revitalization of the Soviet economic system they will not be able to maintain superpower status over even the medium run, let alone the long run.

During Mr. Gorbachev's three years in office, he has become increasingly radical in his prescriptions for change. He has apparently come to believe he cannot make the necessary economic changes through reinvestment and more efficient planning. What is needed is a really fundamental revolution in the minds of the Soviet people. *Perestroika* is not just restructuring the economic system. The first year in power Gorbachev simply sought to accelerate production, tinker with the economy, to strengthen labor discipline, and to get rid of drunkenness, with the clear implication that these steps would be sufficient to overcome their economic difficulties.

A year later it was clear that these measures alone, though not fully successful by any means, were not good enough. Gorbachev was becoming increasingly radical in terms of his prescriptions for fundamental economic restructuring or renovation. On top of that, he apparently came to believe that the Soviet people were too apathetic and too corrupt. Then he has added *glasnost*, his policy of openness or candor, as a tactic to discredit the past and to mobilize the intellectuals to support his reform efforts. *Glasnost* provides near-term payoffs, greater freedom for publication, more lively theater, arts, literature, newspapers, et cetera. For a certain portion of the public that alone is a significant payoff. It has its downsides as well. It helped bring about tremendous public unrest among the minority nationality groups in the USSR.

Then he added to this a year and a half ago the theme of democratization. From the first this has been one of the least well-defined of his ideas. On one hand Gorbachev certainly wants to retain a one-party Communist State. But, on the other hand, he wants to attack both the party bureaucracy and the governmental bureaucracy, which, he is convinced, are strongly resisting his restructuring.

ing efforts. His latest theme, "All power to the Soviets", so evident at the recently concluded Party Conference, is aimed at shaking up the bureaucracies by revitalizing the government councils at different levels.

This represents a new initiative designed to bypass existing bureaucratic structures and to mobilize popular participation. Now in the midst of all this, the economic reform is not going well. The simultaneity of these demands has led to confusion and not to general economic upturn. There has been no improvement in the supply of food in the stores, in housing, and the like. There are bold goals and there is hope that the *perestroika* will eventually pay off. But Gorbachev keeps saying that the Soviet people are going to have to wait for a long time to get the real payoffs. It is a very difficult position.

I think Gorbachev is a populist, he does want better things for the Soviet people, but it is also a self-interested revolution. He basically wants to create a Soviet system that works, that is a more powerful and effective competitor on the international scene.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ray.

Mr. RAY. I have no questions.

Mr. MURDOCK. I have one question I would like to ask. Both of you recommended we needed to see deep reductions, serious reductions. Both of you suggested testing the Soviet Union with Arms control proposals, and one of the things that has occurred to me is as you go through a series of deep reductions you are probably still left with forces capable of offensive operations.

And I looked at this chart Mr. Karber provided that shows a tremendous number of widgets on the Warsaw Pact side, very few widgets, in some cases almost nondiscernible widgets, on the NATO side. You reduce Warsaw Pact forces down to the—presumably to the NATO levels.

This, I assume, is a challenge you are going to put to the Soviet Union. Haven't you cleared out an awful lot of the underbrush? How do you provide at reduced levels forces that look defensive in nature? How do you define what a defensive, albeit reduced, force structure looks like for either side?

Mr. KARBER. I will try that. I don't think there is such a thing as "a defensive design" force structure. That is, the West European left sort of invented the term "defensive defense", thought of as infantry with Panzer Faust or light antitank weapons. Well, people with those same types of weapons waged very successful offensives in the jungles of Southeast Asia. What one is talking about is the capacity to launch an offensive that is decisive early, that is in which an opponent can attempt to get operational and strategic depth very quickly in a campaign, an offensive in which the incentives are for him to strike before the other side has time to prepare, so that it is an unstable balance in a crisis, that the incentives are all the wrong direction.

So, yes, you could cut the entire Warsaw Pact mechanized forces down to 100,000 men with machine guns and rocket launchers and they would still have an offensive potential. They could march through the woods and fight our guys in the woods, or turn around and go the other direction.

What one is focusing on is the power, the speed and the depth of the operations, and what that capability means when one side believes that he may truly be able to achieve strategic results in that theater by using it decisively. That ability to use it decisively tends to have the biggest payoff, at least in most military thought, when you are the one with the initiative, you set the plan, and particularly if the other fellow isn't terribly well prepared.

So the idea of you orchestrating your power and the other opponent sort of in a reactive mode, not efficiently responding, is sort of the model. It seems to me that that then is the focus. It is not taking the theater offensive away, it is taking away the power, that combined capability to go after early and decisive results.

In the presentation I had given earlier, I commented favorably on Senator Nunn's proposal which argues for, in Central Europe, the Soviets pulling out 50 percent of their ground forces and the U.S. pulling out 50 percent of ours. It has the appearance of equality, each superpower pulling out half of its forces. For the United States, that is 2.5 divisions; for the Soviets, it is 13.

In conventional firepower it is about five to one—they pulling out five times as many assets as us. In a residual environment as the result of the superpower 50 percent cuts, the Soviets, in my view, would not have a significantly decisive capability to have the incentive to seize the initiative, to launch an attack prior to our preparation without extensively re-deploying additional forces into the theater.

By having those additional forces take time and visibly move into the theater, it allows our side to gain probably our most—since we ceded the initiative to the other side as to who starts the campaign, gain what is probably the most important element we will ever get, and that is the ability to prepare our own terrain and prepare our defenses. In that case, I think we end up being much stronger.

Yes, we are 2½ divisions lighter, but he is 13 divisions lighter. Yes, he can bring back those 13 divisions probably faster, even if they went to the Urals, but not a lot faster, than we could bring our 2.5 back. In moving those forces visibly across Eastern Europe in that size to get ready for his offensive, what he has done is given us the kind of preparation and warning NATO armies are prepared to respond to. We have difficulty mobilizing—we have never even tried it—and it is extremely costly, politically and economically, to have short or partial mobilization. We are optimally designed to respond against unambiguous warning, to fly over an additional thousand U.S. aircraft, to have the Europeans mobilize their reserves, and I think we are going to put in a much better fight than we ever thought we would if we have that kind of preparation warning time.

NATO's response to the new talks was to reduce the other side's ability to have a short warning or surprise offensive in Central Europe. It seems to me that is a manageable, reasonable goal. It will not end the offensive, but it can greatly stabilize that balance.

Mr. WARNER. Let me add a couple points. I think Mr. Karber has captured them well. What you are trying to do is make the Soviets go through a highly visible mobilization phase. That is why arms control with regard to force reductions should be complemented by

further operational arms control of the Stockholm variety. That is, measures that would help make force deployments more visible, setting off unambiguous trip wires in the capitals of NATO if Pact forces were reintroduced in areas from which they had been withdrawn. Such transparency would increase the chances that appropriate political decisions would be made if Pact reintroductions were taking place so that NATO could respond to them in the ways that Mr. Karber was describing.

As far as the forces themselves are concerned, Jack Snyder has written on this recently, there is little argument regarding which forces are most important in the ground forces area. The crucial centerpieces of modern, armor-heavy and firepower-heavy warfare are tanks and artillery, particularly self-propelled artillery. Those are the queens of the Soviet battlefield. They are available to the East in enormous numbers, and there are great asymmetries in these weapons that favor the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies over the United States and its NATO partners.

Therefore, if one is going to establish a common ceiling on these key categories of armaments, substantially asymmetrical reductions will be required. Other kinds of equipment that might be reduced as well include armed helicopters, bridging equipment, and possibly a final one, which is very controversial, so-called strike or tactical, air-to-ground attack aviation. With regard to the latter, the Soviets assert that there is a vast asymmetry in "strike" aviation in NATO's favor. I am not convinced of this. That is why the definitions, worked out during the initial data exchange of which kinds of aircraft are to be included in this category and of what geographic areas are to be covered, will be so important. All these things will have to be worked out in detail.

The biggest downside to including tactical aviation in the East-West reductions at this time is largely the question of the serious concerns and substantial anxiety in Europe about the nuclear response capability of NATO alliance in the wake of the INF Treaty. We have taken a decision with the INF Treaty to remove U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles and the Pershing II's from Western Europe and to go back to reliance for longer-range nuclear strike capability on dual-capable tactical fighter-bombers. This leads me to doubt that the United States should be prepared to put tactical aviation on the table in the new Vienna talks on force reductions.

I think in any case that the general balance in tactical aviation in the quantitative sense is just about equal. Once we get the definitions straight I don't think it will turn out that NATO enjoys a vast advantage. Moreover, at a point when we are reassuring the Europeans that the key to the nuclear dimension of flexible response for longer-range attack, including the capability to strike the Soviet homeland, rests precisely on these aircraft, we should not be putting them on the table for reduction. I believe now is the time in the European force reduction negotiations to concentrate on reducing conventional forces. It is not the time for another zero or a movement toward zero in nuclear delivery systems.

But the question of including dual-capable aircraft will make for a lively discussion. It is already the main bone of contention between negotiators from East and West in the current mandate talks in Vienna. It is also a bone of contention among Western specialists on defense and arms control matters as they anticipate not

only initial Eastern proposals but the next stage when both sides get down to the hard bargaining. People are already asking what is it the West will need to give up in order to obtain deep, unequal cuts in the Pact's tanks and artillery? Tactical aviation may eventually be included in the negotiations, but we ought to be very conscious of the negative effects on the nuclear aspect of NATO's flexible response strategy.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you both very, very much for helping us with this. It was a very interesting discussion. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Can I invite the other witnesses that are going to talk to us today to join us at the table. Let me welcome the next two people that have come to talk to us about this topic. We have Dr. Jack Snyder, who is Associate Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, a leading Soviet expert who has published very extensively, most recently in *International Security*, on the issue of Soviet arms controls policy; we also have Dr. Steven Meyer, the Director of Soviet Security Studies at MIT, also a leading Soviet expert; and often published on a number of articles and books on the subject; he also has a forthcoming article in *International Security*.

Let me at this point ask both of you for opening comments, and, indeed, if you want to respond to something you heard in the earlier discussion today, please feel free to do that. If you heard a question or issue that came up that you disagreed with or wanted to add something to or supplement, please feel free to do that at this point.

Jack, why don't we start with you.

STATEMENT OF JACK SNYDER, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Mr. SNYDER. Since Ted Warner almost completely stole my thunder from my prepared remarks, I will just address two or three questions that did come up during the course of the questions and answers earlier this afternoon.

First of all, how strong are Gorbachev's incentives for fundamental changes in the direction of cuts in the size of Soviet armed forces and a defensive restructuring of those forces, and how would we know for sure if we saw it, if Gorbachev really were deeply committed to a movement in that direction.

First of all, I don't believe that exercises, at least in the near term, will show us much. Even if we see the Soviet Army engaging in exercises with a defensive component, what we are going to be picking up is not some long-term movement toward fundamental restructuring along the lines of nonoffensive defensive, but rather the defensive component of the counter-offensive strategy that both of the speakers talked about earlier.

Likewise, I am not sure that the movement of military managers into the civilian sectors of the economy per se reveals a deep, abiding, long-term commitment to movement of resources out of the military and into the civilian sectors. In fact, the Soviet military themselves, when they have talked about economic reform, have had in mind the maintenance of a command economy where the civilian sectors would operate better so that in the long run the military could milk those sectors for its own purposes.

What I would see as an economic change that would be a more decisive tip-off about Gorbachev's long-term plans in this regard

would be market reforms of the Soviet economy. This would vitiate the value of the military's priority claim on resources, which can only be exercised fully in a command economy.

More generally, I think that this question about how would we know if we saw something that would tell us that Gorbachev was really serious about fundamental cuts and fundamental defensive restructuring is the wrong way to pose the question. The Soviets themselves have said that these sorts of fundamental cuts and fundamental restructuring can only take place in the context of a bilaterally negotiated arms deal. You will not get the Soviets switching to nonoffensive defense on their own. Consequently, there will be nothing unilateral in the way of hard facts to point to.

Consequently how seriously they approach negotiations and how seriously they reciprocate overtures of our own along those lines will be the way to tell. Nonetheless, I think that it is worth reiterating some circumstantial evidence that Gorbachev has strong incentives for changes in military policy, which are recognized as such by him and the civilian reformers around him. These are things that have been discussed already today.

One is the incentive to reduce the defense burden, which we and some Soviets now believe to be about a third higher than we had formerly thought it to be, because we now believe that the Soviet GNP may be that much lower than had previously been estimated. This is due to our changed view of the value of Soviet statistics.

A second factor is that Gorbachev and foreign policy intellectuals around him are coming to understand that the shadow of Soviet offensive military power on Western Europe has a galvanizing effect on the military preparations of NATO, for example, on the willingness to accept Pershing II and cruise missiles, and moreover has a mobilizing effect on COCOM that keeps COCOM hanging together. (COCOM is the committee that coordinates Western restrictions on exports to the Soviet bloc.) They understand if they want to demobilize COCOM, make it unravel, they are going to have to take away the offensive shadow of Soviet military power.

Another incentive is that the Soviets are seriously interested in movement toward denuclearization. They understand that some diminution of the conventional threat is necessary to move further in that issue area.

And, finally, the reformers want to avoid a high technology arms race which they believe the Soviet Union is ill-equipped to run successfully.

So for all these reasons I believe that Gorbachev and the civilian reformers around him do see powerful incentives for deep cuts in their conventional forces and for some sort of a restructuring of those forces in a more defensive direction.

Now, the second question that follows logically from this is will Gorbachev and the reformers have the power to push through these kinds of changes in the Soviet Politburo? Gorbachev has opposition within the civilian leadership, and as was articulated earlier today, the Soviet military's idea of defensive doctrine is certainly not radical cuts and not restructuring along the lines of nondefensive defense.

Consequently, there is a potential coalition between the Soviet military and some of Gorbachev's civilian opponents which might

be able to block radical movements in the directions that we would like to see. We don't have a crystal ball, so we don't know how strong that coalition will be in the future. But let me just say that it is not at all clear that Gorbachev will have to have dramatic success in his reform policy in order to have a powerful argument for going ahead with these military reforms. In fact, one might argue quite the reverse: the worse, the better.

As Ted Warner was pointing out, that is how it has worked so far. Initially, Gorbachev thought he would get away with moderate reforms, but when things have failed at a level of moderate reform, he has always taken the next most radical step. If, as many of our Sovietologists are saying, the Gorbachev reforms in their present state will not instantaneously and immediately lead to dramatic economic successes, this will, according to the doctrine of "the worse the better", give Gorbachev all the more incentive to go for more fundamental restructuring of Soviet military forces.

A third question is whether the international environment will promote the kind of changes that Soviet reformers might like to see along the lines of nonoffensive defense. Here I would argue that a forthcoming American attitude in negotiations on the basis of the principles of nonoffensive defense might help make Gorbachev more credible in his domestic political debates with military skeptics and civilian political opponents. If the United States was forthcoming in negotiating with Gorbachev on the basis of the principles that he has articulated of nonoffensive defense, it would help Gorbachev show the Soviet military that he can solve Soviet security problems at the negotiating table.

It is especially important for him to be able to show that he can solve the particular threat that the Soviet military was touting so highly in the early 1980s, namely, NATO's coming high technology threat in the area of conventional warfare. I think it will be a big political leg up for Gorbachev if he can show the Soviet military that he can get out from under that threat through negotiated arms control based on the principles of nonoffensive defense.

Well, I was going to raise the question of whether we can design a defensive force posture that is designed to be defensive dominant, but I may have spoken a little bit too much, so why don't I—

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. SNYDER. Okay. I think it is possible to design such a force posture. Basically what one would try to do is to re-create the World War I stalemate. One would do this, first, by emphasizing in one's force postures barriers and fortifications; second, by having insufficient armor and heavy artillery to break through those barriers and fortifications and finally by having air power that was slanted in the direction of air defense and slanted away from the direction of deep strike, ground-attack aircraft that would have an incentive to preempt, for example, against the air bases and command and control of the opponent.

Regarding limitations on air power, Ted Warner says that the Soviets see a great asymmetry in NATO's favor in the European conventional air balance and thinks that this will be a problem for conventional arms control negotiations.

I don't see that as a problem at all. Let's assume that the outcome of such negotiations would be to have moderate-to-low, equal

levels of air power. I say all the better for us if the Soviets thought that they were getting a huge benefit as a result of that mutual reduction because they rate the capabilities of our deep strike aircraft highly. To me, that means that they would, therefore, be willing to give up a lot of ground forces in order to get that benefit.

Now, let me just add one caveat on the interaction between redesigning forces for non-offensive defense and the numerical reduction of forces.

Again sticking with the World War I model, one of the things that made offensives so hard then was not just technologies that favored the defense, but the density of the deployments of the forces on the front.

Anyone will tell you that a more thinly populated front will facilitate maneuver by the attacker.

A more densely populated front will hinder it and provide advantage to the defense.

When we think about how we are going to sequence an arms control agreement, I think it is important to carry out numerical reductions either after a restructuring or in tandem with the restructuring.

The Soviets' own proposals are somewhat ambiguous in this regard.

As Ted Warner ran through the stages, stage 1 is talking about the numbers. Stage 2 is reducing asymmetries which could involve some restructuring early on. Stage 3 is the large numerical cuts; and stage 4 is the completion of the restructuring in the direction of non-offensive defense.

So what the Soviets are proposing may be in line with the important desideratum of making sure the restructuring does not follow the numerical cuts, but at least goes in tandem with it.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Snyder follows:]

SOVIET CONVENTIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
AND THE GORBACHEV DOMESTIC REFORMS

Statement of

Jack Snyder

Associate Professor of Political Science
Columbia University

before

the Defense Policy Panel

of the House Armed Services Committee,

July 14, 1988.

- SOVIET CONVENTIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
AND THE GORBACHEV DOMESTIC REFORMS

In the Soviet Union today, there are two quite different military reform movements, one promoted by civilian foreign policy intellectuals around Gorbachev and another promoted by modernizing elements within the Soviet military itself. Understanding the difference between these two reform impulses is crucial in interpreting current developments in Soviet force posture and arms control policy, and also in crafting an American response.

Civilian Reformers

Civilian reformers in the Soviet Union are arguing for significant cuts in force levels and a restructuring of Soviet force posture along strictly defensive lines, involving a reduction of the proportion of tanks, deep-strike aircraft, and other offensive types of weapons in the force postures of the two sides. While some prominent scholars and journalists have argued that the Soviet Union should implement some of these measures unilaterally, the official position is that large cuts and full restructuring would hinge on reciprocation by NATO. These civilian reformers, Gorbachev included, feel that such steps are necessary to the success of radical economic restructuring at home and a stable relaxation of tensions abroad. Gorbachev's foreign-policy braintrust is convinced that the

shadow of offensive Soviet military power, whether the SS-20 or the surfeit of conventional armored forces, has provoked a high-tech arms race that the Soviet Union is ill-prepared to run. It has also, in their view, kept political barriers to East-West trade high, thus preventing the Soviet Union from enjoying the fruits of the international division of labor and the stimulus of deeper contact with more vibrant economies.

Reformist intellectuals are also arguing for a reduction in the defense burden on the civilian economy, which is now seen as perhaps one-third higher than was previously thought, due to a downward revision in assessments of total Soviet GNP. And as the effectiveness of timid economic reforms becomes discredited, the bolder reformists are increasingly urging extensive market reforms, which would disrupt the Soviet military's ability to use its priority claim on resource through requisitioning in the command economy. As the CIA has noted, by about 1992 when the Soviets will have to face the decision to retool for a new generation of weaponry, there will be a zero-sum competition for high technology resources between current military production and investment in the civilian infrastructure that will be essential to the success of perestroika. Reformist civilian defense intellectuals around Gorbachev are quite aware of these tradeoffs.

Military reformers

Themes put forward by reformers within the military bear a superficial resemblance to some of the ideas of the civilian reformers: e.g., the rhetoric of "defensive" conventional strategy, deemphasis of the main battle tank, and an awareness that Soviet security in the future will hinge on the revitalization of the civilian technological base. Nonetheless, the basic mindset behind these themes is quite different. Reformers within the military are thinking about streamlining the Soviets' musclebound force posture and preparing for a contingency in which the Warsaw Pact might have to fight temporarily on the defensive. Worrying that the civilian leadership may balk at allowing the Soviet military to seize the initiative at the outset of a war, they are thinking more seriously about the possibility that the Pact would have to absorb NATO's offensive, especially its air offensive, before going over to a decisive counterattack. Worrying also about the NATO high technology threat to the tank-heavy Soviet force posture, the military reformers are pondering a future in which the punch of a combined-arms offensive is weighted more toward distant air attack and less toward massed armor. Already, there may be some movement toward breaking up cumbersome armored divisions into more nimble, smaller units with a different mix of weaponry.

Like the civilians' reform concepts, the ideas of the military reformers require domestic economic reform, but

reform of a radically different kind. The arms race in high technology weapons which the military reformers envision would fit not with a market economy and a radically reduced defense burden, but with a less far-reaching administrative reform in which the military sector would continue to enjoy its priority status in a streamlined command economy. Military writers discussing the need for economic restructuring always envision reforms of this type.

If the ideas of the civilian reformers hold sway, we may see a reformed Soviet Union that, much more than in the past, will pursue arms control as a long-term instrument to promote strategic stability and mutual security. Their inclination will be to seek ways to implement the concepts of stable nuclear deterrence and non-offensive conventional defense on a long-term basis in order to (1) facilitate the radical domestic reforms that they think are necessary, (2) create the stable international political and economic environment that they think is conducive to reform at home, and (3) stabilize the military balance as a goal in its own right. The ideas of the military reformers, however, suggest the continuation of a highly competitive military relationship, in which both sides will strive continually to produce new types of weapons that have considerable offensive potential. If they hold sway, the military relationship will be only a bit more stable than that which we have known in the past, ameliorated only by the fact that the Soviet military is becoming less wedded to the notion of

seizing the initiative at the outset of a war and gaining the advantages of strategic surprise.

Implications for American responses

Understanding this distinction between Soviet civilian and military reform perspectives is important for avoiding inferences that are either excessively skeptical or excessively sanguine. On the one hand, Gorbachev's rhetoric about "non-offensive defense" should not be dismissed as mere public relations just because Soviet operational changes thus far lay heavy stress on the offensive component of a strategy of decisive counterattack. In the long run, Gorbachev may be serious about implementing non-offensive defense, but he may need more time to think through the details, a commitment by NATO pledging reciprocation, and a domestic climate in which the military has less opportunity to ally with conservatives in the Politburo. On the other hand, if the Soviets were to announce tomorrow the dismantling of two armored divisions in East Germany, this would not necessarily mean that the Soviets had abandoned all interest in the ability to carry offensive operations into West Germany. A shift away from excessive numbers of tanks towards greater readiness and high technology weaponry would not necessarily mean a shift from offense to defense in Soviet strategy.

I would draw the following policy prescriptions from the above analysis. The U.S. should enter into a serious

dialogue on conventional arms control with the Soviet Union on the assumption that Gorbachev's pronouncements about non-offensive defense are substantive, not just propagandistic. In this context, we should discuss the construction of barriers along the Inter-German border, asymmetric reductions of armored forces, mutual reductions of deep-strike ground attack aircraft and missiles in the Central European theater, and/or other measures designed to hinder the prospects of a preemptive air attack or any cross-border ground offensive. Taking Gorbachev's proposals seriously might, at a maximum, lead to a truly stabilizing agreement. At a minimum, it would stimulate more detailed analysis of Soviet security options by Soviet civilians, who have heretofore been a relatively weak counterweight in the face of the Soviet military's near monopoly of detailed analysis of security policy, especially in the conventional area. Soviet civilian intellectuals have borrowed some general concepts from West European proponents of "non-offensive defense," but they have not worked out a detailed, concrete plan for implementing those principles in a conventional arms control agreement. If the West would agree to take those principles seriously as the basis for East-West negotiations, it would help to institutionalize the positive role that Soviet civilian defense intellectuals are just now beginning to play in the Soviet defense debate.

At the same time, the U.S. should avoid getting lured into agreements that put off defensive restructuring to some

far-off, perhaps never-to-be-achieved, "final stage" of an agreement. The current Soviet proposal, for example, suggests exchange of data on conventional forces in stage one, large cuts in the size of conventional forces in Europe in stage two, and restructuring of force posture along the lines of non-offensive defense in stage three. The problem with this is that the mutual thinning of forces achieved in stage two would make a Soviet offensive easier by creating more room for offensive maneuver along the Central Front. Since traffic jams and dense force-to-space ratios are good for the defender, NATO should insist that defensive restructuring should precede or go in tandem with -- not follow -- numerical reductions. Such a formula may be negotiable, since Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has said that "at all those [three] stages of the negotiations, we are ready for reciprocal reductions in offensive arms of all types including tactical nuclear weapons, attack aircraft, and tanks."

In short, American arms control policy should leave the door open to Gorbachev's proclaimed concept of non-offensive defense, while closing the door to the Soviet military's idea of returning mobility to the battlefield through smaller, readier, higher-tech, offensive and counteroffensive forces.

Evidence to support the foregoing argument can be found in my recent article, "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options,"

International Security (Spring 1988), pp. 48-77, with a discussion of the broader political background in my earlier article, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansion?" International Security (Winter 1987/88), pp. 93-131. See also Shevardnadze's speech at the United Nations, June 8, 1988, reprinted by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, daily report for the Soviet Union, June 9.

The CHAIRMAN. Before Dr. Meyer begins, we will go and vote. We will vote and be right back.

[Brief recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will come back to order.

Dr. Steven Meyer is recognized.

**STATEMENT OF STEVEN MEYER, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY**

Mr. MEYER. Thank you.

I appreciate the opportunity to be here and air my views on this subject.

I have provided a statement for the record.

I would like to summarize a few of the key points.

The CHAIRMAN. We will put the full statement in the record, without objection, at this point.

Mr. MEYER. Thank you.

I would like to emphasize a few key points. Some touch on issues aired already, but I would like to rephrase them in my own words.

The basic question is how will this new thinking translate into changes in Soviet forces deployment and operations? How will we know it if it does happen?

Gorbachev's new thinking on security is a mixture of substantive changes in Soviet military doctrine and procedural innovations in Soviet defense policy-making. The new thinking is not, however, a framework for force analysis. It is not a framework of operational criteria for developing forces. It is not an explicit blueprint of force development. It is a political tool that is intended to enable Gorbachev to recapture the Soviet defense agenda.

Essentially, during most of the Brezhnev period, Brezhnev really abdicated his responsibilities in this area and allowed the General Staff the opportunity to define defense requirements, define the threat, and provide the policy options. Basically, what the Politburo did was meet and sign off on it.

What Gorbachev is trying to do is take that agenda-setting function back, and he has.

I believe his desire is to constrain and ultimately reduce Soviet defense requirements in the decade ahead. I don't think he had a real interest in scrimping and saving on current defense procurement accounts. This distinction is important because Soviet defense resource allocation is not done in rubles. Defense rubles are like monopoly money. They have no real value. I believe that Soviet defense resource allocation is done for the most part in terms of physical resources.

When the Chair asked whether or not it made a difference to have large strategic cuts even though only 6 percent of the Soviet defense budget is caught up in strategic forces, the answer is absolutely; because in the area of strategic forces, the use of precious resources is very extensive and to not have to put those into weapon systems, to not have to put those into the production of weapon systems could make a large difference in the ability to modernize the economy.

We are not talking about taking rubles from the defense sector and being able to buy something in the civilian economy, we are talking about actual resource use.

Indeed, Soviet high-level sources admit they cannot ever tell what they "spend" on defense. They cannot say, in terms of rubles, what it is they could do in the civilian economy if they didn't buy a force of SS-24's because they are not comparable rubles.

The same is true for operations and maintenance.

You can't take the ruble value of military operations and maintenance and translate that directly into purchases in the civilian economy. Here, we are talking about saving petroleum, lubricants, oils and other materials that can be elsewhere used in the economy; and that is what Gorbachev is trying to do.

He is trying to look into the next decade and prevent the defense demands on those resources ahead of time so they can be allocated to industrial renovation in subsequent five-year plans.

The five-year plan coming up in 1991 is the first five-year plan Gorbachev is really able to do something with. The current five-year plan was inherited, and there was very little Gorbachev could do with it.

That includes to defense resource allocations, as well. In any case, what Gorbachev needs to do now is demonstrate that the policies of the new thinking can reduce the threat.

If he can demonstrate that he can reduce the threat, then he can constrain future military requirements in the next five-year plan and the five-year plan after that. In this respect, there is good evidence that the Soviet defense plan is done in ten-year plans where long-term allocation is included because without exception, Soviet weapons programs extend over a 10- to 15-year period in the procurement cycle. So you need 10-year military planning horizons.

Gorbachev's new political thinking is attempting to constrain the threat in two ways.

One, Gorbachev is trying to redefine the threat independent of what the West does by calling attention to the dangers of inadvertent nuclear war, while minimizing the threat of deliberative nuclear war. He is arguing that the danger of nuclear war now is a threat that exists independent of specific U.S. weapons programs.

But he does also emphasize the need to reduce the deliberate threat via political measures and that is what the new thinking is all about.

Seen in this light, I think Gorbachev's new defense concepts—reasonable sufficiency, defensive defense, and other things—really more directly address what does not need to be done in Soviet defense policy than what needs to be done. Therefore, I think it is difficult to predict what one should expect to see because I believe Gorbachev is using it more as a veto than as a way to lay out requirements.

Have there been any effects of the new thinking to date? The Soviet unilateral nuclear test moratorium in 1986 and 1987 was a product of the new thinking.

Soviet willingness to undertake asymmetric reductions in the INF treaty, I think, was a product of the new thinking.

I can't imagine that happening under the old thinking.

Soviet willingness to permit intrusive verification in INF and other arms control agreements, willingness to consider deep reductions in START and the partial withdrawal of Soviet forces from Mongolia and the in-progress pull out from Afghanistan.

I don't believe any of these would have come about under the old philosophical frameworks that were employed.

Notice that each is sort of a grandstand, one-shot event and I think the reason is that the new thinking is undergoing a trial by fire in a tentative piecemeal fashion.

On one hand, Gorbachev is arguing that the new thinking validates his arms control policies, including the willingness to take into consideration the other side's threat perceptions—including asymmetric reductions. But on the other hand, he is using those agreements to validate the new thinking. He is doing two things at once essentially and there is some tension there.

Basically, I think what we are witnessing now on his part is a "try-and-see" strategy which he can pursue as long as there is not a political consensus against him.

Gorbachev doesn't need everyone on the Politburo to agree with him, and indeed they don't. But as long as the opposition cannot coalesce, he is free to explore these policies.

At the same time, many Western observers believe that there are things that have occurred in Soviet defense policy that are allegedly the consequences of the new thinking, but which I think close examination reveals are not.

One has to be careful about giving too much credit to Gorbachev on the new thinking.

For example, some point to the fact that the Blackjack strategic bomber has not been deployed as we predicted, and that this example shows restraint under Gorbachev's new thinking.

There is, however, good evidence that the Blackjack has been delayed due to technical problems and that that program will, indeed, go ahead, even under the new thinking.

The same is true with respect to delays in the SS-18 follow-on and the SS-24.

I believe that the delays here are technology dictated and I think there is good evidence to support that.

Some have also detected an apparent change in Soviet training exercises and operational procedures.

There seems to be increased attention to defensive actions, defensive operations in Soviet training literature and field exercises.

Indeed, if you draw a line in time where Gorbachev began his new thinking and take the average number of defensive exercises before and after, there are more such exercises after.

As anyone who has taken an elementary statistics course knows, such observations are often aberrations. If you look at the time series, and, instead of looking at the averages, you examine the annual values and plot their overtime, you see a trend. In other words, the Soviet military increased its interest in defensive actions long before Gorbachev came to power.

It turns out that by the late seventies, the Soviet military rekindled its interest in defensive operations and beginning around 1979, the General Staff Academy undertook a major study of defensive activities.

By 1982, the Ground Forces had actually dedicated one monthly issue each year of their journal to defensive activities and had begun to increase its emphasis on defensive operations in annual exercises.

Thus, by the time Gorbachev became General Secretary, the trend toward increased defensive training was already in place.

If you do this time plot, you will see that where they are today is where you would have predicted they would have been without Gorbachev, without the new thinking.

Let me just touch on readiness and O&M declines. There appears to be a decline in readiness and operations among the Armed Forces.

That is true in the Navy, appears to be true in the ground forces, and research studies we have done at MIT suggest it is true in the Air Defense forces as well.

I would argue that this decline in O&M also predates the new thinking, that O&M resource cuts, began around 1982 with Brezhnev's famous address to the military where he said, look, guys, you are not going to get any more, you either use it more efficiently or make do with what you have. And if we look carefully, we find that the cutback in Navy out-of-area operations may have more to do with the retirement of Admiral Gorshkov than anything else, because he seemed to have some special relationship with Brezhnev that allowed him to garner resources.

So I would caution against assuming that all these things we now observe are rooted in the new thinking, because they actually go back before the new thinking.

Nonetheless, while Gorbachev can capitalize on them it suggests that there are limits to what he has been able to accomplish so far.

Let me give you an example on the other side. Some have pointed to the fact that the revelations about the deep underground shelters in Moscow suggest the new thinking is nonsense—why would they be constructing these deep underground shelters if—the new thinking—arguing that nuclear war can't be won—was true?

The fact is that those programs were begun over 20 years ago and they are just now reaching completion. Resource expenditure on those programs peaked long ago sometime in the late 1970s or early 1980's, and for Gorbachev to stop them now would be ridiculous. There is almost no cost involved in finishing that project.

In sum, correlating actions such as weapons programs, or changes in operations, with words, is very slippery. Time lags are easily overlooked and, moreover, our projections of what forces we expected to be deployed are done in an environment with a lot of uncertainty. One has to be very careful about assuming that a new doctrine significantly affects current programs.

What should we expect in the future? The Soviet weapons development process operates on a 10- to 15-year time line. Similarly, tactical and operational innovations are first tested in units in the interior Soviet military districts and may take 5 to 10 years or more to eventually diffuse among the rest of the armed forces; thus it is unreasonable to expect to see any major program or operational impact after only a few years of the new thinking.

Even if everybody signed on to the new thinking, instant change cannot happen. You have to look out a decade or more.

Going to the question of what might one expect to see and how would you know if it was the new thinking, I really believe that the only area where I expect to see something definable and understandable is in the area of strategic nuclear forces.

Here I believe that major changes are possible and, should they occur, would be quite discernible as being part of the new thinking. Military and political sources in the Soviet Union are almost unanimous in arguing that parity is the basis for strategic sufficiency as it pertains to strategic nuclear forces; and that parity exists now.

They claim to have a preference for parity at lower levels. There seems to be agreement that nuclear weapons have a declining margin of utility and thus lower force levels are acceptable.

Since the new thinking places considerable weight on first strike stability, I would expect to see a willingness on the part of the Soviets to negotiate the mutual elimination of their most potent counter-force capability, something they have been unwilling to do before. If they are willing to get rid of a large stock of those ICBM's— and admittedly they are going to want a trade for the D-5's and MX, but if they are willing to remove them and consider a balanced triad and one with considerably less counter-force capability, then I think that would be a product of the new thinking.

I can't imagine such a change occurring under the old system where the military came up with the ideas about what to do in defense. But I also think that this can only occur in the context of mutual reductions. They are not going to do it by themselves; unilaterally.

First, the general purpose forces area is much more complex and I think far more susceptible to misinterpretation.

The new thinking, as it pertains to general purpose forces, is still largely in the agenda-setting phase. It is not a largely accepted body of doctrine in any sense of the word. The evidence from Soviet political and military literature, as well as interviews with political, military and government officials, strongly suggests that there is far more reticence about how to apply the new thinking to general purpose forces than there is in the strategic nuclear area.

Second, there is not a lot of expertise, on conventional forces in the U.S.S.R. outside the professional military. That is a crucial difference between general purpose forces and the nuclear area: the Soviets have a substantial cadre of scientists and specialists who are very familiar with nuclear forces and have "as much experience" in nuclear war fighting as the military. They don't have equivalent specialists in the area of general purpose forces and the military has fought conventional wars and thus has a lot of expertise built up.

Third, glasnost has come to the defense area and many of the ideas being articulated are not officially accepted views, so what is and what is not part of Gorbachev's own agenda in the general purpose force area is becoming more difficult to determine.

I have had Soviet military people tell me that what Soviet political people are saying was not official policy. I have had Soviet political people tell me what other political people were saying is not official policy. I have had Soviet academics refute what other Soviet academics say—it is really a confusing situation here, so one has to be careful. Just because an article appears in a journal

under the heading "New Thinking," does not mean that it really has anything to do with either official Soviet policy today or policy in the years ahead.

Fourth, is implementation of the new thinking for general purpose forces will require the assistance of the military in ways that are not necessary for changes in strategic forces, and that really makes a very big difference.

I expect that any significant change in Soviet general purpose forces therefore will, of necessity, occur in the context of the mutual negotiations.

On the question of unilateral perestroika, unilateral restructuring of Soviet conventional forces, the fact is that the military uses the word "perestroika" all the time but only with respect to personnel problems, discipline, training, attitudes and work habits.

Look at any piece of writing done by a military officer on military perestroika: it has nothing to do with force restructuring. It has to do with better discipline, better attitudes, better work habits. So they are not referring to force changes when they talk about military perestroika.

What is interesting is when you talk with Soviet military officials and ask them about any possibilities for unilateral restructuring of their forces, they use perestroika where we use the term "force modernization." This morning it was mentioned that there was Soviet interest in moving to a corps-type structure and there is evidence that prior to the new thinking the Soviet military experimented with moving from the current division-regiment-battalion structure to a corps-brigade structure.

As explained to me by a general staff officer, the purpose of these changes is to reduce the manpower requirements of the ground forces while maintaining fighting capability. It makes sense if you can cut resource requirements but not military power.

Soviet military officials insist that reasonable sufficiency in general purpose forces exists now, that there is no need to make a change, and that if changes are going to occur they are going to have to occur mutually. Any unilateral change is not going to involve lowering capabilities, though it may change manpower.

I think it is somewhat ironic therefore, that Soviet force changes that we found disturbing when we called them force modernizations seem somewhat more palatable when we couch them in terms of perestroika, and I worry about that because they are the same thing.

The Soviet position on asymmetric ground force reduction is quite clear. They are proposing mutual asymmetric force reductions, and that includes the naval balance. Their point is that Warsaw asymmetries can be reduced—advantages favoring the Warsaw Pact can be reduced—only if advantages favoring NATO are reduced. There will be no equalization of tank forces without the equalization of naval forces and air forces, and they are adamant that aircraft carrier groups should be considered mobile groups just like tank armies should be considered mobile groups, and that is a new conception that has not been explored.

Thus I am quite skeptical that a major conventional arms agreement that fundamentally alters the asymmetrical force postures of Europe is likely in the next decade, especially if the United States

has to eliminate its 15 to 1 aircraft carrier advantage for a 3 to 1 reduction in the Soviet tank advantage.

I do think that Gorbachev can manage some try-and-see efforts in the conventional force area, the removal of a tank army from Germany or even the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary. It is possible he could do that on his own, assuming that there is no political consensus against him.

But I wouldn't see those as significant changes in the military balance. I would see them as political moves designed to demonstrate the power of the new thinking and to entice the West into some other kind of moves.

Turning to conventional operations—and this is where I will end—I believe that it is going to be impossible to separate the effects of the new thinking, assuming there are such effects, from evolving military trends.

The size and scope of the Soviet general force posture dictates that at least a decade, and I think longer, would be required to fully shift force concepts, provide new weaponry and retrain the troops. I think that in the interim any changes we would see would be quite consistent with the military's own agenda to increase the defensive component of Soviet military strategy and forces.

So you really wouldn't be able to tell. Certainly the Soviet military is going to argue that it is on line with the new thinking, that it is transferring the new thinking in action, but in fact it will be impossible to tell.

In sum, I think that the things we have seen to date are those things that the General Secretary can implement on his own, barring a political consensus against him. I think the things most Westerners would like to see require a much longer time line than Western policy people are willing to wait, and require a much broader military and institutional consensus in the Soviet Union to implement.

We should be concerned not so much about what Gorbachev is doing, but what parts of the new thinking are likely to endure after Gorbachev.

My view is that essentially in the strategic nuclear area we can be pretty sure that what we see today is what is likely to continue into the future, even if Gorbachev is replaced, but the general purpose forces area is very much up in the air. I don't know of any evidence to suggest that it is very widely accepted and I am very pessimistic that it will go very far.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Meyer follows:]

THE IMPACT OF GORBACHEV'S NEW POLITICAL THINKING
ON SOVIET MILITARY PROGRAMS AND OPERATIONS

Statement of

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before

the Defense Policy Panel
of the House Armed Services Committee

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THE IMPACT OF GORBACHEV'S NEW POLITICAL THINKING
ON SOVIET MILITARY PROGRAMS AND OPERATIONS

If Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has accomplished nothing else in his three years in office, he has certainly revitalized the discourse on Soviet military policy in both the U.S.S.R. and the West. Under the banner of "new political thinking" on security, the long-standing tenets of Soviet military doctrine are being examined and, in several key instances, tentatively revised. What remains to be seen is how this new thinking will translate into changes in Soviet forces, deployments, and operations. What to date, if anything, can be attributed to the new thinking on security, and what might we expect to see in the years ahead if the new thinking is implemented? Unfortunately, the answers to these questions are neither straight-forward nor satisfying.

New Thinking on Substance and Procedure

Gorbachev's new thinking on security is actually a mixture of substantive changes in Soviet military doctrine and procedural innovations in Soviet defense policy making. From the substantive perspective, the new thinking is a collection of attitudes towards defense that are notably different from those traditionally ascribed to the Soviet leadership. However, the new thinking -- including two of its core principles: reasonable sufficiency and non-provocative defense -- is most certainly not an framework of force analysis concepts or operational criteria. It is not an explicit blueprint for force development. Rather, it is a political tool that is intended to enable the Soviet leader to recapture the Soviet defense agenda.

Gorbachev's doctrinal review, first and foremost, is a solution to a domestic problem: protecting precious economic resources required for industrial reconstruction from future claims by the defense sector. His desire is to constrain and ultimately reduce Soviet defense requirements in the decade ahead, and not to scrimp and save on current defense accounts. To do this, Gorbachev must demonstrate that the policies of the new thinking can reduce the threat, thereby reducing Soviet defense requirements. This is being

* For a detailed examination of the principles of Gorbachev's new thinking on security and their implications see my forthcoming article: "The Engines and Implications of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security," International Security, Fall (1988).

attempted in two ways: (1) by redefining the threat (independent of western military behavior), and (2) by reducing the threat via political means. Seen in this light, the new thinking has more to say about what does not need to be done in Soviet defense policy than it does about what is required. Ultimately, it is a kind of politico-military wild-card that gives the General Secretary the doctrinal and ideological basis for reshaping the Soviet defense agenda as he deems necessary.

At the same time, the new thinking involves some important innovations in the Soviet defense decision-making process: changes in procedures and institutional roles in devising the defense agenda and formulating policy options. In particular, Gorbachev appears to have removed the locus of agenda setting and option formulation from the Ministry of Defense and its General Staff (which have dominated this function for over 20 years) and distributed among several departments of the Central Committee, the Foreign Ministry, and ad hoc groups within the Academy of Sciences. I believe that without these procedural changes the substantive innovations in the new thinking would have little overall impact on actual programs and operations.

Impact to Date

I believe that there are some notable examples of the new thinking in action. These include:

- o The Soviet unilateral nuclear test moratorium of 1986-1987;
- o Soviet willingness to undertake asymmetric reductions in the INF treaty;
- o Soviet willingness to permit intrusive verification in INF, and potentially in other arms control agreements;
- o Soviet willingness to consider deep reductions in their strategic forces in START; and
- o The partial withdrawal of Soviet forces in Mongolia and the total pullout from Afghanistan.

I do not believe that any of these would have come about under the "old thinking." In particular, it is hard to imagine the Soviet General Staff coming up with the idea of the unilateral nuclear test moratorium or suggesting that the Soviet Union move forward with asymmetric INF reductions.

Notice that each is a kind of "grand-stand one-shot" event. I believe that the reason for this pattern is found in the current status of the new thinking. Far from being fully implemented, the new thinking is undergoing a trial by fire in a tentative, piecemeal, fashion. While the new thinking is supposed to validate Gorbachev's arms control policy (i.e., resort to political means to enhance security rather than military-technical means), he is simultaneously using his arms control accomplishments to validate the new thinking (by demonstrating its ability to reduce "the threat.") This accounts for the almost frenetic pace of Gorbachev's arms control initiatives -- reminiscent of the juggler trying to keep all his plates spinning at once -- and is characteristic of a "try and see" strategy.

On the other hand, many things that western observers believe to be the result of the new thinking are, in fact, not related to Gorbachev's rise to power. For example some have pointed to the failure of weapons such as the Blackjack strategic bomber to be deployed as predicted as a sign of the new thinking in action. This, however, ignores the very real possibility (for which there is good evidence) that such delays are due to technical problems, not doctrinal cold feet. Similarly, the delays in progress with the SS-18 follow-on and the SS-24 more likely technology-based than doctrinally dictated.

Some also detect a "change" in Soviet training exercises and operational practices. In particular, they point to increased attention to "defensive" actions and operations in Soviet training literature and field exercises. In fact, all of this predates Gorbachev by some five to eight years. The evidence is indisputable that Soviet military interest in defensive forms of combat action were rekindled sometime in the late 1970s. Major studies were undertaken at the General Staff Academy, with one apparently headed by the Academy's Chief: General Kozlov. By 1982 the Ground Forces journal Voennoy vestnik began dedicating one entire monthly issue each year to defensive combat. By the time Gorbachev became General Secretary, therefore, the trend towards increased defensive training was already in place. (Of course the military has used such exercises for both domestic and foreign propaganda purposes to demonstrate they are on board with the new thinking.)

Then too, some had expected certain things NOT to happen in light of the new thinking. For example, some have argued recent revelations about Soviet deep underground shelters (ostensively constructed to protect the Soviet leadership in nuclear war) expose the new thinking to be a farce. This ignores the fact that these facilities were planned and constructed over a 20 year period, with the great bulk of

their resource demands expended long before the Gorbachev regime came to power. The completion of this sheltering program represents inconsequential resource commitments at this point and, from a pragmatic standpoint, it is difficult to imagine why Gorbachev would halt them now.

The bottom line here is methodological. Correlating actions (e.g., weapon program developments) with words (the new thinking) is particularly slippery. Time leads and lags are easily overlooked. At the same time, we must keep in mind that our projections of Soviet force developments are merely forecasts made without full knowledge of what is actually intended. If our forecasts are not realized it may say more about them than it does the impact of the new thinking.

What to Expect in the Future

The Soviet weapons development process operates on a ten to fifteen year time-line. By the time a weapons program enters its last several years in development, most of the major capital expenses have been incurred and deployment is almost certain (barring technical problems). Similarly, changes in Soviet army operations are implemented over a very long time-line. Tactical and operational innovations are first tested by units in interior military districts. The results are evaluated and modifications are subjected to further study and testing. Once changes have been approved it takes many years to rework manuals and bring all the forces into line (keep in mind that the sheer mass of Soviet ground forces represents a tremendous amount of inertia.) Thus, it is unreasonable to expect to see any major program or operational impact after only a few years of "new thinking."

One is left to wonder, then, about the possibility of more substantial changes in the Soviet defense posture that might occur in the years ahead: Will the Soviets be willing to give up their strategic counterforce capabilities? Will Soviet general purpose forces be restructured in ways that will remove their offensive potential? Will operational concepts be revamped to reflect the "defensiveness" the Soviet insist permeates their doctrine? Will the Soviet military buildup finally wind down and, ultimately, unwind?

Strategic Nuclear Forces: In the area of nuclear forces I believe that major changes are quite possible and should they occur, will be readily discernable. There appears to be a considerable convergence in views among Soviet political, military, and academic commentators regarding the declining marginal utility of additional nuclear weapons. Soviet

military and political sources are almost unanimous in arguing that parity is the basis of reasonable sufficiency in strategic nuclear forces and parity exists now. Parity at lower levels is said to be preferred, but this will only happen via mutual reductions. The new thinking does place special weight on first strike stability, and that would imply a willingness to negotiate the mutual elimination of the more potent counterforce capabilities. With the exception of a few notable academics who argue that Soviet unilateral cuts are desirable (to set the pace and trend in reductions), there is general agreement that parity at a lower levels can only occur in the context of mutual reductions. There is no reason to expect unilateral reductions in Soviet strategic capabilities.

General Purpose Forces: The area of general purpose forces is far more complex and far more susceptible to misinterpretation. Indeed, recent U.S. interpretations of the Soviet position on conventional arms control only serves to heighten my uneasiness. Here, interpreting the new thinking is complicated by several factors:

(1) The new thinking as it pertains to general purpose forces is still largely in the agenda setting stage; it is not an accepted body of doctrine. Many of its core principles are general ideas without any concrete elaboration. Some are far less acceptable to the Soviet body politic than others. Thus, it is likely that some parts of the new thinking will remain enduring parts of Soviet military doctrine, while other parts are never implemented. The evidence from Soviet political and military literature, as well as interviews with Soviet political, military, and government officials, suggests that there is far more reticence about how to apply the new thinking to general purpose forces than there is with respect to nuclear forces.

(2) Glasnost' has come to some aspects of Soviet discussions on defense. In combination with the change in agenda setting procedures this has resulted in many ideas being articulated that are not officially sanctioned. Even individuals known to have policy influence have been floating ideas publicly that do not have the General Secretary's nod, let alone broader political acceptance. Thus, what is and what is not to be considered Gorbachev's new thinking is becoming more difficult to determine.

(3) There is no pool of Soviet civilian expertise -- and hence no authoritative civilian analysis -- on general purpose forces. The professional military remains the repository of all knowledge on general purpose force

development, operations, and campaign assessment. This contrasts markedly with the relatively large number of Soviet civilian scientists with authoritative knowledge of nuclear weapons programs and employment concepts. Soviet civilians and military have the same amount of expertise in nuclear war-fighting: none.

(4) Implementation of the new thinking for general purpose forces will require the assistance of the military in ways that are not necessary for changes in strategic forces.

With these caveats in mind, I would expect that any significant change in Soviet general purpose forces would occur only in the context of mutual negotiations. Though there has been much talk of "perestroika" (unilateral restructuring) in the Soviet military establishment, Soviet military officials have made it quite clear that what they mean by perestroika is a restructuring of attitudes, work habits, and discipline; they are not referring to forces. Of the hundreds of articles on military perestroika, not one deals with anything outside the realm of attitudes and work habits. (This is a classic example of how political discourse inside the Soviet Union is carried out: you use the other guy's words, but you redefine them.) I believe that many casual western observers have been misled into believing that the military supports the new thinking whole-heartedly because of the frequency with which it employs the terminology of the new thinking.

Moreover, interviews with Soviet military officials reveal that when they do address potential modification to force structures, they use the term "perestroika" where we use the term "force modernization." For example, there is evidence of interest in moving from the current division-regiment-battalion structure to a corps-brigade form of organization. This would, theoretically, reduce manpower requirements while maintaining force capability. Soviet military officials insist that reasonable sufficiency in general purpose forces exists now and that any unilateral changes will not decrease capabilities. As an aside, I would observe that it is ironic that force changes that we found threatening in the past under the rubric of modernization, somehow seem more palatable when couched in terms of perestroika.

Returning to the issue of mutual reductions of general purpose forces, the Soviet position on asymmetric reductions has been clear. Yet, somehow, it has been garbled in the West. They are proposing MUTUAL asymmetric reductions, which includes the naval balance: Warsaw Pact asymmetries will be corrected only if NATO asymmetries are corrected. There is

general agreement among Soviet commentators that the asymmetries between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces tend to cancel. Thus, there can be no equalization of tank forces (an asymmetry that favors the Warsaw Pact) without an equalization of tactical air forces and naval forces (asymmetries they claim favors NATO). Of course, the Soviets also dispute western assessments of the magnitude of the asymmetries favoring the Warsaw Pact. Thus, I am very skeptical that a major conventional arms agreement that fundamentally alters the asymmetric force postures in Europe is likely in the next decade -- especially if the U.S. must eliminate its 15:1 aircraft carrier advantage to gain a Soviet 3:1 reduction in tanks.

Of course the General Secretary can probably manage some "try and see" efforts here as well. The removal of a tank army from Germany, or the withdrawal of the Group of Soviet Forces South (Hungary), would be dramatic politically though irrelevant militarily. Larger unilateral actions are likely to spark political dissent among conservatives in the Soviet leadership.

Turning to conventional operations I believe that it will be impossible to separate the effects of the new thinking from evolving trends in military operations. Even assuming some of the most radical notions of defensive defense were implemented, the size and scope of the Soviet general purpose force posture dictates that at least a decade (and probably longer) would be required to fully shift force concepts. In the meanwhile, much of what we would see would be quite consistent with the military's own agenda to increase the defensive component of Soviet military strategy and forces.

* * *

While the try and see strategy can lead to significant changes in the Soviet strategic nuclear posture, it will have only marginal effects on the general purpose force posture. A more systematic effort to implement the new thinking will be required if Soviet conventional forces are to experience radical restructuring. This will take at least a decade to accomplish and, in the interim, will be for the most part indistinguishable from more fundamental force modernization efforts undertaken by the Ministry of Defense.

In sum, the things we have seen to date are those that the General Secretary can implement on his own -- barring a political consensus against him. The things most westerners would like to see require a much broader politico-military and institutional consensus to implement and, thus, may not reflect the new thinking as advertised.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it now conceded that we underestimated the Soviet GNP and that the percentage of GNP going to defense is higher than we anticipated?

I know a group that has argued that point for some time. Have they more or less carried the day on that argument?

Mr. MEYER. They have not. There is a group of people, both within the government and outside, who argue that in looking at defense over GNP, while we may have correctly estimated the numerator, we have overestimated the denominator. If the GNP is smaller, they argue, the overall fraction of defense as a share of GNP goes up.

I should point out that that critique is based on no reproducible methodology that I am aware of, and I have seen what has been done. You could not replicate the results. They are based on arguments about consumer availability in comparison to other countries.

The problem is the Soviet Union is not a consumer economy, it is a producer economy, and thus the notion of GNP is sort of a funny notion to deal with in itself. As far as I am aware, the center of gravity continues to be the CIA—DIA estimates of what percentage of Soviet GNP is going to military spending.

I should also point out that the Soviets themselves are unsure what that number is, and both high level defense and foreign ministry people have told me they really didn't know what part of the Soviet GNP went to defense. They didn't think of it in these terms and defense was not allocated that way in the first place.

Mr. SNYDER. The downward reevaluation of Soviet total GNP is based in part on the discovery that people out in the provinces were sending to Moscow reports of, for example, cotton crops that simply didn't exist, and that non-existent production was getting figured into the GNP total.

So in part because the statistics are now seen as so totally unreliable, the Soviet GNP figures are almost anyone's guess.

One of my colleagues at Columbia has been working on this and has written a paper, which I would be happy to send to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Please do.

[Deleted. Paper is for member's consumption only].

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask the question, what evidence do we see of differences in attitudes toward nuclear weapons due to Gorbachev, or again is what we are looking at an evolution in thinking about nuclear weapons that was taking place, would have taken place had Gorbachev not arrived on the scene?

I take it that the military would not go along with Gorbachev's extreme views about ridding the world of nuclear weapons. But in any case, what changes have we seen in thinking about nuclear weapons in the whole panoply of use of force by the Soviet Union, and do we see a change due to Gorbachev or was this a change that was taking place and would have taken place whether Gorbachev had come along or not?

Mr. SNYDER. I see a much bigger change in attitude toward conventional military power between Gorbachev and his predecessors than in the nuclear area.

After all, it was in the late Brezhnev period that high political leaders were saying that nuclear superiority had no meaning, that victory in a nuclear war was impossible and so forth. And also in the late Brezhnev period the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Ogarkov, gave interviews in the newspaper saying that there was too much emphasis on nuclear war, that nuclear war was suicidal and that consequently the action was to be in the conventional area.

So I see much more continuity in the nuclear era between the late Brezhnev period than I do in the conventional area. In the late Brezhnev period no one was talking about non-offensive conventional defense. That was an idea that just was not in the political debate at all.

Mr. MEYER. The big difference between the military and the Gorbachev regime on nuclear weapons has to do with defining the real threat.

The new thinkers have been arguing that the real threat in the future is inadvertent nuclear war, that no leader, no country, can use nuclear weapons for political means. Thus nuclear weapons are not going to be used with political intent but, rather, by accident. Therefore the only real way to ensure security is to get rid of them.

That is the premise on which Gorbachev is arguing for complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

The military—and it is not just the military; political conservatives, as well—have said that this is an interesting theory but the danger of deliberate nuclear war remains. They enumerate all the American programs that are in R&D and deployments going on. They try to demonstrate that the West really still believes that it can fight a nuclear war for political reasons because it is investing in all this hardware.

The military argument is that while in theory, Mr. General Secretary, you might be right, in practice the West is preparing for nuclear war, and until they are willing to give up on that notion we must do the same thing. Minister of Defense Yazov, in a book published last fall, said the Soviet Union has to be prepared to use all weapons in war, nuclear and non-nuclear, as long as that is what the other side is going to do.

But the more fundamental point is that by the late 1960's the Soviet military's apparent love affair with nuclear weapons had disappeared. Today the Soviet military has no interest in employing nuclear weapons either in theater or strategically if it can be avoided.

So the military can sign onto things like the INF Treaty, to deep reductions in strategic forces that don't remove the fundamental ability to retaliate and, to some extent, the fundamental ability to limit damage via pre-emption because there is still a large number of weapons.

What they don't agree with is the practicality of going beyond this level down to 5 percent and then to zero.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there a difference of views? Is there a difference, either because of Gorbachev or because of the bringing into debate civilian people who debate military issues?

I mean, in terms of arms control, most arms controllers would like to achieve stability in the military field through a combination

of limiting weapons of certain kinds. Is there any kind of evolving philosophy of arms control in the Soviet Union due to Gorbachev or any new thinking or changes?

Mr. MEYER. I believe there is. I think the civilians have laid out an agenda that consists of the following points.

First, the Soviet Union has to be willing to take into consideration the threat perceptions of its adversaries, that other countries do have legitimate concerns and other countries could view Soviet forces as threatening. Therefore, the Soviet Union has to be willing to make concessions in arms control to allay those fears.

Second, the threat of surprise attack, the threat of large offensive attacks, counter-force attacks, is a destabilizing element even if you think you have those forces only for your own defense. Therefore one should work to eliminate the ability to launch a sudden surprise offensive strike both in the nuclear and conventional area.

Where the problem arises is, how do you operationalize that? For the civilians, they have talked about eliminating tank forces, aircraft and artillery. But for the more conservative or traditionalist elements, that is the wrong way to go about it. They point out some of the best defensive weapons are tanks and aircraft. The internal Soviet fight is going to be over how to implement these notions.

Mr. SNYDER. One way to capture the changed attitude towards arms control succinctly is to say in the Brezhnev period, arms control was based on the concept of parity at the nuclear level, whereas nowadays the prime concept is stability, more or less as we understand it in the West, both in the nuclear and conventional areas.

The CHAIRMAN. If you have a situation where you believe that Gorbachev needs to demonstrate he can reduce the threat and that he really wants to be able to move some of these resources away from the military—as you were saying, Steve, some of the strategic would be very useful to Gorbachev because it frees up some critical resources he might want to use elsewhere. What does that situation tell you about what the West should do in this case? What should they do? What should they propose? What should we want to get out of it?

Mr. MEYER. That is a very important question, and of course it is one of the hardest ones to answer. As I said, the upcoming 13th five-year plan is the first one Gorbachev can call his own, and I believe the reason we have seen him running around madly the last two years in arms control—like a juggler trying to keep all the balls up in the air—is because he was trying to hammer down a very large arms control agenda to demonstrate conclusively early on that the threat can be managed and controlled.

1986, 1987, certainly 1987-1988, the General Staff was busy putting together the threat assessment that goes into the defense budgeting process. The document sets out what they perceive the threat to be in the decade ahead. What Gorbachev was trying to do was affect that assessment through agreements and other political actions.

The unilateral nuclear test moratorium, for example, tried to get the United States to shut down strategic testing programs for a

period of time. The INF treaty, all these other discussions, were designed for political leverage so when the General Staff came in with its assessment, Gorbachev could say, "We don't have to worry about that anymore. That is no longer relevant." And at that point you get an INF agreement.

Let me mention something that is counterproductive here. Right after the INF agreement was signed and we were going through ratification, there was a lot of discussion in the West, not just in the United States, about compensating actions: new nuclear deployments to reinforce flexible response.

This came up in the Soviet Union in many different fora, as an example of how the new thinking was not going to work. It was merely going to redirect U.S. military programs in other directions. "You tell us you controlled the threat, you say you got rid of Pershing and cruise missiles," the critics argued, "and now the West is going to build new weapons better than those that were there, so the new thinking does not work." This is an example where Western actions really can affect how the new thinking is perceived, and its utility to Gorbachev as a way to manage their own defense requirements process. That is on the negative side.

On the positive side, I don't think we should make any concessions we feel are not in our own interest. But we should be prepared to make deals that support our security goals. I could give you an example that I know many people would disagree with.

It seems to me over the next 25 to 30 years, I would be amazed from an engineering standpoint if we could build a strategic defense system that could destroy 50 percent of Soviet warheads. I would be amazed at that kind of record. But, conceivably, it is possible. Fifty percent is not impossible.

Well, if Gorbachev is offering an agreement whereby he will get rid of 50 percent of his warheads right now and we don't have to spend the money to negate them, then there is no more risk involved than if we build a defense system that we would expect to be able to negate 50 percent of those warheads, but with considerable error margins around that effectiveness measure. It seems to me that that kind of agreement, give up SDI, maintain the ABM treaty on the one hand, sign a START agreement that gets rid of 50 percent of the warheads, we have accomplished what the strategic defense system would do for trillions of dollars over two decades, and we have gotten something out of it. And Gorbachev can go and argue, which is what he wants to do, "Now, you see I have gotten rid of this problem. Don't tell me we need to go ahead with these new programs."

In the conventional forces area, I think it is much more difficult because that is an area where I don't think Gorbachev has the information he needs. He doesn't have the expertise to lean on that he would like, as he does in the nuclear forces area. So my own sense is that the proof for him in the short term is going to be in the nuclear, not in the non-nuclear area.

Mr. SNYDER. Let me answer that question in a different context. The typical pattern of Russian reform has been that under conditions of high threat from more advanced societies of the West, the Russian or Soviet autocrat has felt the need to whip his society to reform itself in order to keep up against that threat.

This pattern of reform, or revolution from above, has gone along with policies of increased authoritarian pressure in the Soviet or Russian society, the creation of the command mobilization economy, the creation of a military-industrial complex whose growth has largely been the object of these previous attempts at reform.

Gorbachev is really the first Soviet or Russian autocrat to have a different kind of reform strategy. He believes that that old reform strategy has run into a dead end. The Soviets are now at a stage of economic development, where they must make the transition from a top down, "extensive" strategy of economic mobilization, to a strategy of more market-oriented, "intensive" development of the economy. To achieve that, Gorbachev understands that he needs not an autocracy, but greater trade and openness to the West; not a command economy, but an economy based more on market principles; a political coalition that is not based on heavy industrial party and military bureaucracies, but rather on the creative and technical intelligentsia and the urban middle class.

I think the Soviet Union can probably reform itself according to either of these two paths, the traditional militarized authoritarian path or the new Gorbachev marketized, more liberal path. Which route is taken may depend in part on the international environment that the Soviet Union finds itself in. That international environment has an arms control component and it also has an international political economy component.

Without going into details, the general idea is that if in arms control and international trade we create conditions whereby the Gorbachev version of the reforms can succeed, then there is a greater likelihood that the reform effort will go in that direction rather than in the more traditional authoritarian direction, which previous Russian reform attempts have pursued.

The CHAIRMAN. I take it both of you agree that the interest in improving the economy in the Soviet Union only carries the Soviets so far, that we would be willing to do some deals in defense, but not make great unilateral concessions in the area of defense. Is that—

Mr. MEYER. Well, the General Secretary only has so much authority. He is really not a Stalin-like figure. And as I think I have mentioned several times, in the case of Gorbachev, as was also true with Krushchev, as long as there is no direct opposition or consensus against him, he could do a lot of interesting things. But he has to be careful. General Secretaries are vulnerable on defense issues, just like Presidents are, and they have to constantly look around the Politburo table and try to figure out who else is interested in being general secretary one day. So they can go a distance but they can't go too far. There is a natural political, built-in limit beyond which it would be dangerous for a general secretary to move.

Moreover, in the Soviet Union the general population actually is very pro defense; they really do understand the sacrifices they have had to make and why they have had to make them, and it is very easy to galvanize the population if it were made to appear that the general secretary had just gone off the deep end and was putting the country in danger. And who is it that is going to make that argument? Other members of the Politburo and the military.

Now, I happen to be one of those who does not believe the military has much political power at all. In fact, I have argued several times it really has no independent political power. It can't make things happen. It has to wait for a patron on the Politburo to decide for his own political reasons to adopt their platform and use them as part of a lever against the other people in the Politburo. And that is what they are doing, sitting back and waiting for someone to materialize who will take up their challenge.

The CHAIRMAN. That is true even when the defense minister is on the Politburo?

Mr. MEYER. Yes. Don't forget, times change, obviously, and when Grechko was on the Politburo as defense minister, he was a marshal, a real military officer. He did have a strong voice on defense issues, but he was only one member of the Politburo. He was there because he was a close friend of several Politburo members, among other things.

Dimitri Ustinov was not a military officer, he was a defense industrialist. They gave him the title of marshal because it was the thing to do. He was not the Ministry of Defense's representative on the Politburo; he was the Politburo's representative in the Ministry of Defense. He was politically powerful there, especially towards the end of his tenure when Brezhnev was debilitated and later died.

Ustinov had a lot of political power. He and Gromyko ran the Politburo for a while. There was never a sense he looked at the Ministry of Defense as his constituency. He had a very strong national security orientation, but so did all those guys on the Politburo at the time.

This is different from saying that the generals and marshals send a note to the General Secretary and say, "Look, when you go to Reykjavik, be careful what you say. If we don't like it, you're in trouble." The best they can do is send memos to other members of the Politburo on their positions and hope one of these guys gets electrified.

Mr. SNYDER. I would like to add one twist, though basically agreeing with what Steve just said. One possibility for unilateral reductions would be mutual unilateral reductions. After all, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact will be under demographic and/or economic pressure to reduce their defense burdens in the coming years, so there is some possibility that both alliances willy-nilly will take unilateral decisions to reduce their conventional forces in Europe.

One question that we may wish to think about is whether that sort of willy-nilly reduction on both sides will be better or worse than a negotiated agreement. My own instinct is that a negotiated agreement would be better, because it is more likely to have as a major component the restructuring of the character of the forces in a defensive direction.

If it is willy-nilly, you are likely to get stuck with the offensive kinds of force postures that both sides, especially the Soviet side, now have, only with the number of the forces thinning out, something that helps the offense even more.

Mr. MEYER. Let me amplify that point, because it is very important. I can imagine, as I said earlier, Gorbachev having the politi-

cal wherewithal to pull a tank army out of East Germany or to even remove the Group of Soviet Forces South. How do we respond to that?

The same kind of try-and-see strategy that was used in the nuclear test moratorium, could be used again.

I agree with Jack; I find that somewhat frightening, though he didn't use that word, only because we have no idea how the intra-NATO negotiations would go. We could have very bizarre mutual unilateral trade-offs where the Soviets are setting the pattern for what they want to do and they find reasonable, and we are trying to find some politically useful response to it. So in a sense a negotiation is a far more militarily useful approach.

I would only point out the Soviet new thinkers who are involved in this policy area disagree with both of us. They think if they wait for negotiations, reductions are never going to happen. They are arguing strongly for unilateral Soviet moves because unless it happens, they believe that the bureaucracy, the military institutions will prevent it from ever occurring.

They are frightened of that. They see a window of opportunity in the next two years, and what they want is the Soviet Union to step forward and make bold moves because they don't see a threat to their security, and in doing so, force the West to go the same route. After that has begun, maybe you move into negotiations after you have gotten the log rolling.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do they see the opportunity disappearing after two years?

Mr. MEYER. They see the opportunity disappearing in the next two years because they say if you allow this thing to get caught up the way MBFR was, you end with institutional committees where the military sits down and analyzes the proposal and gives you 4,000 reasons why it can't work. They are well aware in the area of conventional arms control the military voices are dominant. There is no one who can say, "Wait a minute, you are wrong about tank warfare," the way they have scientists and others who can stand up and say, "Nuclear exchange models don't work that way."

It is a different kind of setting, and some new thinkers really feel some desperation. They feel that unless they get something rolling in two years, it is possible the steam could come out of the new thinking entirely. There is a sense that they have got to make it pay off now.

The CHAIRMAN. Define for me "new thinking" in defense. Give me a summary of what it means to say "new thinking" in the area of defense.

Mr. MEYER. The way it was explained to me, this is the old thinking: The more military power you have, the better. You can really only guarantee your own security with military-technical means. You can't count on anybody else. So, again, the more, the better, and if you are worried about security, buy more, you add to it, and that by and large you never can really have enough. That is what the old thinking it comes down to. You have to be capable of fighting everybody at once, because the worst possible things could happen.

The new thinking argues that this is the way of thinking crazy, that essentially Soviet security is interwound with the security of

its neighbors, and therefore the more they build up, the more they threaten their neighbors; the neighbors will build up, and make the U.S.S.R. more insecure. The new thinkers argue that there are natural limits to militarily useful power in the nuclear era—and here I have to point out the new thinking is heavily, heavily caught up in the whole notion of the nuclear era and what that really means can no longer be a rational approach to settling political disputes, including the historical dispute between socialism and capitalism. Because ultimately we would have a nuclear war which would destroy both social systems.

There is interdependence among states, they argue. The U.S.S.R. exists in a political, economic and militarily interdependent world, and the Soviets have to worry about the security of other countries as well as their own.

The bottom line is very un-Marxian. Under the old thinking, all wars were political. Under the new thinking, war can begin and end without political decisions due to technological failure. It is a philosophical difference, and I believe it is heretical in a traditional Marxist-Leninist way.

That is why you see debates in the Soviet Union now about whether capitalism is militaristic. In the past this was taken as a given. It was a ridiculous question to raise. Now Gorbachev himself has raised it and the answer from the new thinkers seems to be, no, capitalist societies don't have to be militarist.

Mr. SNYDER. The new thinking is a theory about how to cause detente, and it is the opposite of the old Soviet theory about how to cause detente.

The old theory went under the name of the theory of correlation of forces, which said that the stronger the socialist camp gets vis-a-vis the West, the more realistic and prudent the people in the West will understand that they must be, because they have no alternative. Consequently, as the correlation of forces shifts in the Soviets favor, detente will deepen, become more stabile and also operate to the Soviet benefit.

The new thinking is the exact opposite. The new thinking understands that the more the Soviets threaten the West, the more impossible detente will become; and that if detente is to deepen and become stable, the Soviets will have to take into account the security concerns of the West.

Mr. MEYER. There is an irony here when one compares the new thinking and the old thinking among the same authors. We now have people like Zagladin, Bovin, and others admitting that prior to the new thinking, Soviet nuclear strategy was based on nuclear war-fighting and victory in nuclear war.

These are the same guys who had been telling us for 10 years that they never had such notions in their doctrine and strategy at all. Suddenly, they are coming forward saying the real difference is the notion of victory in nuclear war. There can be no victory in war. The military instrument cannot be used to pursue political means. It is really quite revealing.

The CHAIRMAN. Where does new thinking in the defense area come from? Out of what kind of institutions, what kind of people, where do these ideas originate in the Soviet Union? Where do the come from?

Mr. MEYER. There has really been an interesting change in process and procedure in agenda setting. Gorbachev has informal advisors who talk to him and who have set up informal committees that do analyses and write position papers. They are composed of people of the Academy of Sciences (physical sciences, political sciences, historical sciences); from the central committee departments, (people who work for Dobrynin and others). These individuals and committees come up with notions of their own.

Policy advice—new ideas—are channeled through Gorbachev's own staff and the staff of some of his colleagues such as Yakovlev and others. An example is the writing that has appeared recently on reasonable sufficiency by Zhurkin, Karaganov and others. They have been at the forefront of new thinking on issues of reasonable sufficiency. Their first piece appeared in *New Times*, which is a throw-away journal in some ways, published in English, German, and Dutch, and other languages. And that was read by somebody on the Central Committee staff who called up one of these authors and said, "Why don't you come and talk to me."

They trooped up to the Central Committee offices and they talked for awhile and some staff person passed a memo higher up to the secretariat and got a call saying, why don't you have them write a piece in more detail. And it turns out they were finishing a piece that appeared in their own institute journals which was a longer piece in Russian.

So that was sent up and later they were called and said, why don't you write a piece for "Kommunist", and it appeared quickly after that. It is a set of informal networks. When I asked this question about their policy process I was told Americans tend to concentrate too much on formal institutions.

What Gorbachev has done is stop going to the General Staff saying, "give me some ideas about what I need to do on this," and what he essentially said is, I will come to you with ideas and you can do the analyses. He started tapping into political and academy individuals. Some military people as well have been involved in some of these groups. The foreign ministry has come to play an increasingly important role.

So what we have seen is an elevation of individuals in the foreign ministry, the Academy of Sciences, and the Central Committee staff in agenda settling and option formulation. And, as I said, because of Glasnost some of these ideas are somewhat crazy. As one of the new thinkers said to me, there is now a real competition among the new thinkers to get the General Secretary's ear. So they are sort of outdoing one another trying to influence policy.

Mr. SNYDER. Let me add one point, which is that some of the ideas in the new thinking come from the west. In particular, Soviet academics have picked up on the ideas of the Palme Commission on European security. They are not just parroting them back at the west but, in fact, are thinking seriously about these concepts and trying to develop them in a Soviet context.

In the early 1970's, some people thought that the west should use SALT I to teach the Soviets the basic principals of strategic stability. It didn't work then because political conditions for such tutelage in the Soviet Union were not right.

But in the current context of the late 1980's, it does seem that the trans-national climate of security ideas is having an effect on Soviet security thinking. It is something that we should keep in mind when we ponder this problem of how to strengthen the hand of the new thinkers in the Soviet Union who, as Steve Meyer rightly states, have quite limited analytical capabilities when it comes to delving into the details of conventional forces and conventional arms control analysis. We should keep in mind the trans-national flow of ideas to the Soviet Union as a way of providing briefing materials for the new thinkers.

Mr. MEYER. It turns out that General Secretary Andropov actually was tired of having the General Staff come up with ideas. He thought it was too narrow. And he set up a group to investigate the possibility of setting up a national security council staff modeled on the U.S. National Security Council staff system. This committee actually met and tried to come up with ideas. Andropov got sick and died, however, when he died, that whole idea disappeared.

It turns out many of the people that were part of that process are now some of these new thinkers. They are members of these informal committees that have direct access to Gorbachev's staff, to Yakovlev's staff, to Dobrynin's people. I am told the idea for the Soviet unilateral nuclear test moratorium came from a committee of the Academy of Sciences. The scientists convinced Gorbachev it would be a useful and interesting idea. (It turns out it failed and they got burned a little bit for it from their colleagues.)

But that is where those ideas are coming from. I should note that these new thinkers are worried if they come up with too many ideas that fail Gorbachev will either by decision or default end up turning back to the military for more traditional source of information.

The CHAIRMAN. Would the Soviets have come up with these ideas about trading on the F-16's? I mean, is that the kind of idea that would have to come through that system?

Mr. MEYER. It is conceivable. There is really no way to know because now the General Staff has become mobilized over the new thinking. This is something we haven't really talked about. But I think the Soviet military identifies much more with general purpose force issues than it does nuclear issues, and what they are really bugged about now are all these academics are coming in and starting to encroach on their turf.

They had no trouble with the nuclear area, but they really have trouble with civilian involvement in conventional force issues. There is information that within the General Staff they have organized committees and working groups to try to come up with their own new thinking. So it is quite possible that the idea about trading the F-16's came within more standard military channels, but I really don't know the answer to it.

Mr. MURDOCK. I would like to follow up on an idea that Ted Warner mentioned in his presentation. His theory states that if there is little return on economic Perestroika, that might leave Gorbachev to push more actively on the military side. I think we can see out of the last party conference that one of the reasons why Gorbachev started turning towards political restructuring and

more Glasnost and more democratization within the party was an understanding he couldn't get economic restructuring without it.

Now I am wondering, even though many of us have been under the assumption that Gorbachev is unlikely to do anything that is militarily significant without it being in a multi-lateral context, that if the continued dead weight of the economic system and the inability of the system to respond were to continue Gorbachev can't pull back and become conservative and he actually will push much harder on the military side in a Khrushchevian type of manner than we might be giving him credit for.

In particular, might he not say, I can't do anything on the European theater because that has always been the theater of choice for the military; where there are too many apple carts for them to deal with, but perhaps some unilateral agreements over in the Far East where he might have asymmetries that he can use in terms of the Chinese. The Chinese seem to be better at bargaining in mutual unilateral moves than we in the West.

Might he not pull back on modernization in the air defense sector or some of the other sectors not as closely related to the central theater?

Mr. MEYER. Well, let me make two points. First of all, the kinds of resources Gorbachev needs to save won't come from unilateral withdrawal of forces. They can only come from demobilization of the force structure. The issue is not to pull out 10, 15 divisions; what do you gain by doing that? The idea is to cut the threat to the extent you don't need to have 10 or 12 or 15 of those divisions in the force structure, nor the overall requirement for maintaining those forces. In this way the overall demand for military machine building goes down so you can utilize productive resources for the civilian side of the economy.

By withdrawal alone, you could take the tanks and you could take divisions and lower their readiness status. You could put the tanks up on blocks and send the troops back to the field, but that is not going to buy you much economic savings if you have a military requirement that under mobilization conditions, you have to bring those divisions back up.

Gorbachev needs to eliminate the requirement for these forces if he is going to free resources over the long term. I think the more basic question you asked is: let's assume in five years Perestroika hasn't done much for the economy, what then? Suppose that this little spurt in economic growth that has recently been reported begins to taper off and Gorbachev goes to the Politburo meeting and says, "The weight on my shoulders here is the military burden. It has to be reduced or I am never going to succeed."

The difficulty he is going to have is that by then many of his reforms will have been in place for five years. The counter will be: "the military burden is not the problem, the problem is this decentralization you imposed, this new cost accounting system you have installed. The problem is all this entrepreneurship is wrecking the structure of the economy, and that is where our problem is." And I can imagine Gorbachev's replacement, or a Politburo in the years ahead where he has greatly constrained powers, where the consensus seems to be the problem really lies on these anti-socialistic reforms, if you will, that have taken place.

On the other hand, it is unclear to me that they do understand very well the dynamics of what is going on inside their own economy. If Gorbachev's Politburo colleagues (or actually what I call the Moscow mafia, the four or five people who make the key decisions)—are convinced the economy is going to collapse unless something is done, then significant cuts could occur. There is no doubt it can happen. The question is what will be the political dynamics? Will political ambitions on the Politburo be such that even though other Politburo members agree with Gorbachev they are not going to say so because some may want to become General Secretary someday?

Will it be the fact in Azerbaijan or the Baltic states that because of Glasnost, because of democratization, political turmoil is such that Gorbachev just becomes weak in general and thus all his policies become discredited? That is another possibility people haven't thought about. In the U.S.S.R. there is tremendous spill over among policies just as there is in the United States. I think it is hard to answer that question in the abstract, you need a scenario, and it is so dependent on the political variables at the time that I think if you had Gorbachev here and asked him this question, he wouldn't know how to answer.

My guess is he would say, of course, that is what I would do, but whether he could actually implement that would depend on a much broad constellation of forces.

Mr. SNYDER. Let me address the other part of your question, which conjures up the image of a bidding war between NATO and China to try to get the Soviets to take their conventional force cuts on our frontier. On the one hand, the Chinese have laid down three conditions for improved relations with the Soviet Union. Two of them, the pull-out from Afghanistan, and from Cambodia, are perhaps in the process of being met. This leaves the third one, the issue of conventional force balance on the Sino-Soviet border. By that logic, one might indeed think that Sino-Soviet negotiation on conventional forces would be the next logical step.

On the other hand, I think most analysts would say that the Sino-Soviet dialogue has probably not even proceeded as far yet as the dialogue between the Soviets and the west. There hasn't been a Sino-Soviet summit yet. So that sort of bidding war is at most something to think about for the future.

Mr. MURDOCK. I wasn't thinking of a bidding war. It struck me the Chinese are doing a better job of playing hard ball than the people in the West. They are saying, sure we will talk to you, but only after you give us what we want. But to return to the question again, what it suggests to me is if we look at it from Gorbachev's prospective and Gorbachev says, I want to reallocate large amounts of resources away from defense and towards the civilian sector, the only way he can do that is through radical and comprehensive arms control. If he tries to do it unilaterally, he is threatening his own power base. If economically the situation gets bad enough, Gorbachev can turn and try to make the argument that we have got to do it unilaterally, because there is going to be too many political arguments to be used against him. He will fail on political grounds even though the military itself may not have the power to do that.

It suggests to me that the only way that he can make changes internally is, as you suggest, by changing the threat assessment, and the only way he can change the threat assessment is not through mutual unilateral reductions, but through negotiated reductions. When he goes back to his own Politburo and the conservatives are there, the only thing they may believe is a negotiated agreement that is signed, sealed, and delivered and seems to have some prospect of permanency. Even though, as you mentioned, there are things the West could do to even undermine those things through compensating actions.

So it suggests to me if the West wants to see defensive defense or non-provocative offense and lots of transparency, the only way it can see that happen on the Warsaw Pact side is if it is willing to engage itself in radical comprehensive arms control.

Mr. SNYDER. I think that in general I would agree. For Devil's advocacy purposes, I might be able to invent scenarios for Soviet troop reductions that did not depend on negotiated arms control. For example, if over the next 40 years Soviet GNP continues to shrink as a result of a dramatic failure of all types of Soviet economic reform, then that is inevitably going to have an effect on the Soviet conventional force structure, whether there is arms control or not. The cycle of empires would then go to work with a vengeance, even without negotiations.

The other Devil's advocacy scenario would be a "the better-the better" scenario, where the Gorbachev reforms work so well that Gorbachev no longer needs the old forces of militarism, conservatism, and Marxist—Leninist empire-building at all in his coalition, because he has demonstrated that some sort of a market reform can make the Soviet economy boom. Therefore, he could build a political base on the middle-class yuppie entrepreneurs that the market reform creates. On that basis, Gorbachev's radically restructured political coalition could proceed unilaterally to its own minimum-sufficiency arms posture agenda. That is a Devil's advocate position.

But basically, I agree with the view you put forward, namely, that we will need negotiations, at least for the foreseeable future, to get large reductions in Soviet conventional forces.

Mr. MURDOCK. All of you who have appeared today talk about the need to test the Soviets' seriousness through arms control. One of the things that I have heard people say is we need to articulate firmly what it is about what the Soviets have that scare us and concern us so they know precisely what it is that we want from them, and that we leave it to them to state what it is about our forces that concerns them, and then we start to horse trade.

You are already setting politically insurmountable obstacles for Gorbachev. In order to get where both sides say they want to get, equal levels structured against preemptive attacks, surprise attacks and defensive in nature, in order to get there, the Soviets have to give up so much more than we do, that is going to weaken Gorbachev's case.

If we spend a lot of time identifying how big the first parts are, when he goes back to his own Politburo he can say, "I can get this new conventional arms control, but I am going to have to give up so much more of this." We all know INF was pretty controversial

in terms of the Politburo anyway. The more attention we focus on the asymmetries, perhaps the harder it is for Gorbachev to deliver it, which suggests to me maybe we shouldn't be focusing upon spelling out what we want the Soviets to get rid of, rather what we should focus on is spelling out where we want both sides to end up sometime in the future, five to ten years from now; and set up those kinds of guideposts and not worry so much about what we have to give up on both sides to get there but identify where we want to be five years from now, where we want to be ten years from now.

Mr. MEYER. Well, I agree with those sentiments. I think that the Soviets can make some very interesting and, from an objective point of view, legitimate case about asymmetries they believe favor us.

I mean, the numbers are quite interesting when you start playing with them, because unlike strategic forces (which sit in a certain place and yet reach everywhere) in the general purpose force area, the issues are foggier. One can talk about numbers of tanks and planes, but that is not what the forces are all about, nor how they are employed. It is not like you would line up all 50,000 Soviet tanks, point them in one direction and attack.

I think the first stage of conventional arms control—just agreeing on what the numbers are that are relevant—is going to be a major headache. Once you get past that, determining what the asymmetries really are, and how they should be counted will be even more difficult. The Soviet military is very good at this kind of analysis; they do their homework. I think people will be surprised at the extent to which they can come back with arguments you can't toss off the table. I think we are going to find that this is another MBFR: you are going to get bogged down forever debating those numbers.

The approach of thinking about where you would like the mutual force postures to be in five years and where you want to be in ten years allows for much more political maneuvering on each side, but it assumes each side knows where it wants to go. I am not convinced that NATO has any sense of where it wants to go and what it wants to look like. I am more confident that the Warsaw Pact does.

I think the General Staff system the Soviets have and the nature of the relationship they have with their allies makes it far easier for them to, conceive develop, and implement force structures that they find useful *a priori*, and I think most of ours come about *ex post facto*. I think it is more complicated than you made it sound.

Mr. SNYDER. Let me just add one saving grace in the situation! Both sides probably inflate the capabilities of certain aspects of the other side's force posture, especially its threatening and offensive features. The Soviets probably inflate the capability and offensive value of our air power, naval forces, and technological potential to develop SDI. We probably inflate the value and offensive capability of their ground forces. This mutual over-valuation of the offensive forces of the other side in some ways creates the basis for incentives to trade. We can each trade away things that the other side sees as more valuable and more threatening than the owner of those forces credits them with being.

Mr. ELLIS. I just have one question.

Sitting in on three days of hearings, briefings, I have a great frustration when we elevate this back to the strategic and the nuclear level.

Depending on who you are listening to and what the specific topic is, a lot of this military doctrinal change seems couched in or at least predicated on the fact that there has been a major shift in Soviet thinking or attitudes towards nuclear weapons at that level and now we are looking at the problems of the conventional general purpose force level.

Other than Soviet statements going back 10 to 15 years, and arms control offers what evidence is there that the Soviets have changed if you have in a direction away from war-fighting preemption, supplies, victory in nuclear war?

I have read studies that correlate Soviet statements with world events, INF, decisions with nuclear freeze movements, with SALT II ratification.

You look at force structures now and projected through the nineties, you don't see the intelligence community saying that things are going to change drastically away from counterforce.

In fact, we have had hearings on the START framework and I think it is not unfair to say that some of us have come to the conclusion that the current START framework if enacted may create vulnerabilities for the United States if you believe there are none now or will increase existing vulnerabilities.

So other than Soviet statements, what evidence is there that Soviet ideas on nuclear doctrine and attitudes toward nuclear weapons have changed or will change?

Mr. MEYER. You have chosen one of the areas where fortunately I have actually written something about that and I would be happy to send it to you.

Basically, your question is the right question, but the answer you are not going to be happy with.

The answer is that over the last decade, the Soviets have developed a very wide range of strategic options. It is not true that they have built a nuclear force designed only for first strike, or that they have built a nuclear force designed only for deterrence and retaliation.

It is clearly not true because they wouldn't have bothered to buy forces that can survive a nuclear attack if they were absolutely positive that they were going to launch everything before the United States.

If you look at the Soviet strategic force structure, look at their training exercises and skip their statements, you see they have a fairly large menu of strategic options, depending on a scenario.

They can launch first, as anybody can—even the Israelis could launch first if they wanted to.

They could preempt in a crisis. They have the strategic warning capability now, which they never had before, to be able to try to read the other side's intention in a crisis and go first in a situation where they believe that, if they didn't, the other side would most certainly go.

They have the ability to launch on tactical warning. They have the ability to ride out a nuclear strike. So the bottom line is that

the Soviets have the ability to do what they want to do within certain constraints and limits.

It is also true that the military has not been given a blank check to buy everything it would need to destroy all U.S. strategic nuclear forces. It is clear that the military hasn't gotten a blank check to develop a complete first strike capability. U.S. submarine forces are quite safe at sea and the Soviets haven't procured another 50,000 warheads with which to blanket the ocean, which is what they would need at minimum.

We see a force posture over the last decade that provides a wide range of options, one which includes damage limitation by a combination of preemption and strategic defense, mostly sheltering and dispersal programs.

Having said that, it is also true that if we fight a nuclear war with the Russians in the next decade, the war they fight in 1994 would be very similar to the one they would fight today, very similar to the one they would have fought two years ago because the basic force structures will remain the same and the options will be there.

Now, for all of Gorbachev's new thinking, nobody can convince me that when he is sitting in his bunker and he sees what he considers to be irrefutable evidence that the United States is about to launch an attack, that he might not push the preemption button. Because you ask yourself, "Are you better off going first or going second given I know the war is going to happen."

You are always better off going first. You never know what could happen—you might luck out and wipe out the other side's command system.

So I think your point is well taken. I wouldn't look to statements.

On the other hand, if in five years under START and other agreements the Soviets are really willing to get rid of their heavy ICBM's with great counter force potential, that we see that in their R&D programs what is remaining is just upgrading essentially weapons like SS-25's, if we see that they are willing to form a strategic regime where both sides move away from weapons in the D-5 class, I would be pretty impressed by that because that would be very uncharacteristic.

Also keep in mind that while from the point of view of a target things look pretty nasty, from the point of view of the guy who has got to launch the first strike and got to convince the General Secretary that this attack is going to work, it is a much more difficult problem.

If you look back at Air Force briefings to President Kennedy about the likelihood of being able to launch a preemptive strike against Soviet missiles in Cuba during the Cuban missile crisis, it looks very different from the other side.

It is not that easy, so I would be impressed if they really got rid of a lot of this stuff.

Mr. ELLIS. Would you be impressed if we signed a START treaty based on the current framework? Would that be indicative of a change to you?

Mr. MEYER. As I understand it, we are talking about halving the SS-18 force essentially.

No, that wouldn't impress me terribly much because there is a tremendous residual there, and as forces are upgraded and improved, the uncertainties in the overall force posture decrease; therefore, you can get away with fewer forces.

So, no, I wouldn't be necessarily impressed. Though I still think it is very uncharacteristic of the Soviets, and it suggests to me the new thinking is politically of importance; but it doesn't suggest to me that the nuclear war that would occur post-START as the tradeoffs are currently defined would be very different from the nuclear war we would fight today.

Mr. SNYDER. I have a lot of sympathy with the thrust of your concern about the counterforce capability that would still be left despite a START agreement.

It raise an important question: if these new thinkers are in control of Soviet policy, why is it that they want to keep half their SS-18's? Why don't they want to trade away more of them in exchange for some of the analogous American hard target killers that would be left under START?

There are two possibilities. One is that the parameters of the START I agreement allows the Soviets to keep half the SS-18's because of the influence of old thinkers on the Soviet negotiating position, which strikes me as quite likely.

The other possibility is that the new thinkers don't think in quite so new a way as we suppose.

But either way, I think this is a case where it is important to hold the Soviets' feet to the fire.

There is no good reason why we can't press them to have greater cuts in counter force capability as part of a START I agreement.

This gets to my more general point about creating an international environment that is conducive to reform in the Soviet Union.

It does not create a conducive atmosphere to be willing to sign arms control agreements that don't really require the Soviet Union to reform.

For example, conventional force cuts that cut numbers, but don't restructure the forces in a defensive direction, would send exactly the wrong signal to the Soviet Union. They would not necessarily strengthen the hand of people who want decisive, deep, structural change in the way the Soviet Union does business. And I think that this is a general rule. It applies in the international economic area as well.

Send the signal to the Soviet reformers that we are more willing to trade, but also send the signal that that willingness is contingent on certain kinds of structural changes in the Soviet foreign trade monopoly, the Soviet price system, and so forth.

In short, in strategic arms control and in other areas where we should hold the reformers' feet to the fire and see what stuff they are made out of.

Mr. ELLIS. It seems that a lot of people that are looking at this are going to hold their feet to the fire in the general purpose area; let's see what they are going to do, non-provocative defense or defense of defense.

A lot of folks who have addressed this issue skip over the nuclear.

It is almost assumed that there has been a shift—I don't see it—and, therefore, now let's look for changes at the general purpose force level.

Mr. SNYDER. To add the other side of the coin, part of what we should do is hold their feet to the fire and say we really expect significant fundamental structural changes, such as radical reductions of nuclear counterforce capability, but the other part is not to expect that as a unilateral move, but to offer to reciprocate such moves.

Mr. MEYER. Going back to a point that Phil Karber made earlier about testing the Soviets it seems to me that you are in a period of time now where you will never have a better opportunity to do what you want to do, assuming you know what that is.

What that means is if you really believe that strategic counterforce capability is destabilizing and threatening then you have to believe that your counterforce capabilities are destabilizing and threatening, not just the other sides'.

If you want to hold their feet to the fire, I think now is the time not to be self restraining.

Now is the time to put together your wish list and go in to negotiations and say, "Here is what we need to do."

But, you have to understand that you are putting yourself on that list as well. You are going to have to be willing to make those same deals—get rid of equivalent forces—or else it is not going to go anyplace.

If you want to argue that the Soviets should be new thinkers, then you have to be a new thinker too, and that is going to be the difficult trade there.

I am not sure we know what we want to do. I am not sure we have a defense policy process where it is going to be that easy to make happen what it is we would like to do.

Someone has to convince SAC of certain things, I am sure, and to implement that is going to be very difficult.

If, in going to test the Soviets, you essentially say to them, "If you really believe in your new thinking, do all these wonderful things"—and, by the way, I don't believe in new thinking, so I will keep what I have got, it is not going to get very far.

That is not a fair test.

Mr. ELLIS. Both domestic and international politics of arms control make, when they are necessary, asymmetrical reductions or asymmetrical actions, even unilateral actions all but impossible.

The process we go through on this side just in negotiating among ourselves is not whether or not it is a good idea, but whether it is negotiable or whether it is a basis to begin negotiations. It is a dicey situation if you believe there are asymmetries out there that may require asymmetrical reductions, and how does one propose that without being labeled as a bad-faith negotiator?

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Both of you, thank you very much. It was a very, very interesting afternoon.

Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m., the panel adjourned.]

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